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Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive,
and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution.
Robert Lucas, Nobel Laureate in Economics1
Marie Antoinette said, “Let them eat cake.” But history records no transfer of
sugar and flour to her peasant subjects.
Paul Samuelson, Nobel Laureate in Economics2

INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 1993, less than two weeks before the pivotal
congressional vote that would decide the fate of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Vice President Al Gore was on Larry
King Live—the most watched show in CNN history.3 That night, the
show had its largest audience ever. Over eleven million viewers tuned
in to watch Gore debate NAFTA with the 1990s’ version of a flamboyant-billionaire-turned-protectionist-presidential-aspirant H. Ross
Perot.4 Naturally, the two debaters disagreed.

1. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future, 44 ECON. EDUC.
BULL. 1, 8 (2004).
2. Paul A. Samuelson, Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of
Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization, J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2004, at
135, 144. To be fair to Lucas, he concludes the paragraph that starts with the quoted
sentence by saying: “The potential for improving the lives of poor people by finding
different ways of distributing current production is nothing compared to the apparently limitless potential of increasing production.” Id. Be that as it may, Marie Antoinette lost her head.
3. Larry King Live: NAFTA Debate–Gore Vs. Perot (CNN television broadcast Nov.
9, 1993) [hereinafter CNN Debate]. For the viewing statistics of the show, see Larry
King Live, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_King_Live [https://perma
.cc/P63N-6RZQ].
4. See CNN Debate, supra note 3; Larry King Live, supra note 3.
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Perot warned Americans about the “giant sucking sound” that
they would hear if NAFTA passed,5 as almost six million jobs would
move south of the border.6 He was not alone in his concerns. Trade
unions opposed the agreement as well, worried about large losses of
American jobs.7
But Gore had a completely different view. Not only would NAFTA
not cost American workers, he argued, it would bring 200,000 new
jobs to the United States.8 There would not be even an initial “dip” in
U.S. employment, he reassured the viewing public.9 Perot and the unions were wrong.
As the NAFTA debate raged on, the non-partisan Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) reviewed nineteen forecasts of NAFTA’s economic impact. Whatever the uncertainties, the CBO concluded, the
“models estimate that NAFTA would have little effect on the vast majority of major industries in the United States, and that even the largest of these effects would be surprisingly small.”10 Gore, it appeared,
had the better argument.
Congress approved NAFTA on November 20, 1993, with more
than half of the representatives of Gore’s own party voting against it.11
In the two decades that followed, congressional majorities and presidential administrations acted as if the CBO had perfect foresight. Although advocates continued to sound alarms,12 policymakers remained unmoved. They offered no meaningful transitional assistance
to workers affected by NAFTA and China’s accession to the World
5. Eduardo Porter, Ross Perot’s Warning of a “Giant Sucking Sound” on Nafta Echoes Today, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/
business/economy/ross-perot-nafta-trade.html [https://perma.cc/ZNG9-EUVV].
6. See ROSS PEROT & PAT CHOATE, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY: WHY NAFTA
MUST BE STOPPED—NOW! 52–54 (1993); see also Background Briefing Nafta, White
House, Sept. 15, 1993, 1993 WL 366308, at 7–8 (explaining that Perot’s claim implies—incredibly—that by absorbing 5.9 million U.S. jobs, Mexico would double its
GNP).
7. See EDWARD ALDEN, FAILURE TO ADJUST: HOW AMERICANS GOT LEFT BEHIND IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 82 (2017).
8. See CNN Debate, supra note 3.
9. Id.
10. CONG. BUDGET OFF., ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
ECONOMIC MODELS AND OTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES 61 (1993), https://www.cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/103rd-congress-1993-1994/reports/93doc154.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZF4Q-F5NV].
11. See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 22; H.R. 3450, 103d Cong. (1993).
12. See, e.g., ROBERT E. SCOTT, CARLOS SALAS & BRUCE CAMPBELL, ECON. POL’Y INST.,
BRIEFING PAPER NO. 173, REVISITING NAFTA: STILL NOT WORKING FOR NORTH AMERICA’S
WORKERS (2006); ROBERT E. SCOTT, ECON. POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 308, HEADING
SOUTH, U.S.-MEXICO TRADE AND JOB DISPLACEMENT AFTER NAFTA (2011).
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Trade Organization (WTO) that followed a decade later with U.S. acquiescence. They did not modify the social safety net to help American
workers absorb the economic shocks of trade liberalization. They did
not slow the pace of that liberalization to enable experts to better assess the resulting distributional impacts. And experts themselves remained uninterested in checking whether the CBO’s prediction of
“surprisingly small” adverse economic impacts would turn out to be
true.13 (It did not).
A similar story may be told about the evolution of U.S. competition policy, immigration policy, labor policy, and environmental policy
during the same period. All these policies, we are now learning, gave
rise to large, unintended distributional burdens that were missed by
academics and ignored by policymakers again and again.
The consequences of these decisions have upended American
politics and will continue to do so in years to come. The causes of these
decisions are numerous and complex. But the intellectual foundation
of these decisions is clear. And it is this foundation—or at least its key
elements—that are the focus of this Article.
Over the past several decades, two influential arguments have
dominated academic debates about the proper scope of government
distributional policies. The first argument posits that efficiency should
be the only concern of economic regulation. This “efficiency-only” argument urges the government to ignore distributional considerations
in the design of legal rules. Distribution, the argument concludes,
should be addressed through the tax-and-transfer system alone.14

13. This is particularly true of academic experts. On NAFTA’s ten-year anniversary, the Congressional Research Service reviewed “numerous evaluations” of the economic effects of NAFTA. Not a single evaluation was performed by an academic economist or published in a peer-reviewed journal. The evaluations mostly reaffirmed the
1993 consensus about the small economic impact of NAFTA, though a Carnegie Foundation report did discuss the need for trade adjustment assistance and a possible need
for a larger social safety net. J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., NAFTA AT TEN: LESSONS
FROM RECENT STUDIES 2 (2017).
14. The key statements of this argument are Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why
the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994), and Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency Vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income
Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 414 (1981). For an earlier expression of
the same idea, see Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives
Should Affect Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 264
(1979). For a later contribution, see David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used To
Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2003). The economic model on which the
argument rests comes from Anthony B. Atkinson & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax
Structure: Direct Versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55 (1976).
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The second argument resists government compensation for
those unintentionally harmed by new or changing government programs. Private markets do a better job of protecting people from foreseeable risks than the government ever could, this “no-compensation”
argument explains.15 Besides, if the government does try to compensate unintended losers, the resulting effort is bound to be arbitrary,
unfair, and ultimately unsustainable.16
Taken together, the two arguments urge a decidedly limited government involvement in the distribution of economic resources and
outcomes in society. To be clear, the arguments do not oppose all such
involvement. But they do limit it to certain occasions (generally excluding losses from legal transitions) and certain forms (generally the
tax-and-transfer system alone).17
This Article contends that the government should consider—rather than ignore—distributional consequences both in the design of
legal rules and during legal transitions. This does not mean that the
distributional effect of every legal rule should be measured and taken
into account in the rule’s design. But if the likely distributional effects
are unintended, large, and objectionable, if the efficiency of the legal
rule is doubtful, if the compensating tax-and-transfer adjustment is
not forthcoming (or has not occurred), policymakers should take distribution into account. One way of doing so is to choose among several
alternative legal rules of questionable efficiency the one with better
distributional consequences. Another is to slow the pace of legal
change in certain cases.
This Article also does not suggest that every transitional loss
should be reimbursed. But if losses are large and unforeseeable, if private risk-mitigation mechanisms are unavailable, the government
should step in. Enacting a broad-based transitional assistance program for low-skill workers and replacing our complex, obscure, statespecific social safety net with a simpler, transparent, nationally uniform one would go a long way toward mitigating the losses discussed
here.

15. The key articulation of this claim is Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 535–36 (1986).
16. An early—and possibly the original—explication of this point is Clair Wilcox,
Relief for Victims of Tariff Cuts, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 884 (1950).
17. This brief summary of the two arguments presents their strong, generally recognized version. For a discussion of qualifications and caveats, see infra text accompanying notes 45–53, 60–66.
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This Article is not the first one to challenge the two influential
distributional arguments.18 But none of the previous counters took account of the large body of emerging research in the economics of
trade, labor, immigration, industrial organization, and regulation. The
economists’ findings are so recent that, to the best of my knowledge,
no one has used them to reassess the two arguments. This Article undertakes such reassessment and reaches a stark conclusion: the assumptions underlying both arguments—not just some assumptions,

18. For the counters to the efficiency-only argument, see, for example, GUIDO CALTHE FUTURE OF LAW & ECONOMICS, ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 73–81
(2016), which points out that the efficiency-only argument ignores widespread preferences for equal distribution of merit goods while maintaining economic incentives
in production and distribution of non-merit goods; Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On the Limits of Redistributive Taxation: Establishing a Case for Equity-Informed
Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1, 3 (2005), which discusses the effect of administrative
costs and egalitarian preferences on the choice of distributional instruments; Lee Anne
Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100
MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1052–53 (2016), which argues that political impediments to offsetting distributive adjustments defeat the unequivocal prescription of the efficiency-only
argument; Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule
Design Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2482–83
(2014), which argues that legal rules may be more efficient than the tax-and-transfer
system in reducing inequality in certain circumstances; Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham,
Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157,
167–68 (2003), which draws attention to non-income sources of inequality as a reason
to account for distributional consequences in designing legal rules; Richard L. Revesz,
Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489 (2018), which argues in favor of a
standing interagency regulatory body to address undesirable distributional effects of
legal rules; and Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for
Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 798 (2000), which argues that
possible unobserved within-income-group heterogeneity should lead to distributionally informed legal rules. For examples of objections to the no-compensation argument, see, for example, Michael Doran, Legislative Compromise and Tax Transition Policy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 545–47 (2007), which argues that by binding itself to either
always or never compensating transitional losses, the legislature reduces its ability to
compromise on future legislation; Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1090–91 (1997), which points out that market insurance may be unavailable in particular cases and that public cost of retroactive
lawmaking may be unacceptably high; Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-Time Vs.
Periodic—An Economic Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX L. REV. 305, 328–
30 (1994), which suggests that committing to transition relief reduces investment uncertainty and administrative and operational costs of legislation; Kyle Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1132 (1996), which contests the no-compensation argument as applied to incentive subsidies while analogizing them to government contracts; and J.
Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply
to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155 (1989), which explains why the
no-compensation rule would—and does—give rise to rent-seeking.
ABRESI,

2021]

DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS

1589

but key assumptions—falter when compared to actual outcomes, either in general or in a large and important set of cases. Moreover, once
these assumptions are changed to reflect reality, the policy prescriptions resulting from the two arguments do not merely become indeterminate. Rather, the analytical machinery underlying the arguments
goes in reverse—the policy prescriptions become the opposite of the
original ones.19
The efficiency-only argument assumes that distributional adjustments take place in the tax-and-transfer system, at least “in response
to changes in legal rules whenever these changes resulted in a ‘sufficiently important’ shift in the distribution of income.”20 It is becoming
increasingly clear that over the past several decades, a range of government policies gave rise to such distributional shifts. These policies
unintentionally imposed large losses on a specific group of Americans
consisting of low-skill, low-education, pre-retirement age workers.
Yet the U.S. government has enacted no significant programs aimed at
offsetting or mitigating these losses.21 The assumed tax-and-transfer
adjustments never materialized.
Moreover, the efficiency-only argument stresses the importance
of designing legal rules to achieve economic efficiency. But recent research raises serious doubts about the efficiency of actual legal rules,
and even entire legal regimes. There is growing evidence of multiple
market failures: monopoly power in product markets, monopsony
power in labor markets, and possible anticompetitive behavior in capital markets as well.22 Law-and-economics scholars are increasingly
skeptical about the efficiency of the common law.23 If the assumption
that real-world legal rules are at least roughly efficient is implausible,
it becomes difficult to argue for sacrificing real-world distributional
concerns for the sake of hypothetical efficiency.
Furthermore, it is well-understood that the choice between legal
rules and the tax-and-transfer system becomes complicated if there is
unobserved heterogeneity among people in the same income group.
19. Lee Fennell and Richard McAdams recently advanced a similar critique regarding a related assumption embedded in the efficiency-only argument, pointing out
that the theory’s main takeaway is inverted when (or more precisely, given that) this
assumption fails to hold. See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Inversion Aversion, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 806 (2019).
20. Shavell, supra note 14, at 417.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 258–61 (explaining why the Affordable
Care Act and the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit cannot be plausibly
viewed as such compensating adjustments).
22. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 189–225.
23. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying note 226.
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So only if one assumes that such heterogeneity does not exist (or is
not important) does the efficiency-only argument’s ultimate prescription retain its full force. It turns out, however, that unobserved heterogeneity does exist within the group of low-skill American workers.24
Although less consequential than the failure of the first two assumptions, this heterogeneity adds another reason to reconsider the efficiency-only argument.
Turning to the no-compensation argument reveals a similar disconnect between assumptions and reality. The argument urges no
government relief for unintended losers from changes in government
policies. In its general form, this argument relies on two assumptions.
First, private actors can anticipate future legal changes. Second, actors
can insure against those changes either by buying private insurance
or by diversifying in financial markets.
No doubt, some changes may be anticipated, private insurance
may be available, and diversification may be a realistic possibility. But
for those affected by the changes in U.S. trade, competition, labor, and
other policies discussed in this Article, none of this is true. Economists
are surprised by the magnitude and concentration of negative shocks
from trade liberalization, labor market monopsonization, and other
recent policies—shocks that they are discovering only now.25 Given
that experts failed to anticipate these shocks, American workers who
suffered them could hardly be expected to have had greater foresight.
Financial diversification is of no help for these workers either, and no
private insurance is available. Large, unanticipated, privately uninsurable, and undiversifiable losses of labor income are the classic reason
for social insurance, whether these losses result from legal changes or
not.26 So the no-compensation argument’s own logic points toward
the need for government assistance for those who suffer these losses.
A narrower version of the same argument rejects targeted government assistance even when the factual assumptions underlying the
broad version do not hold. Even if government compensation is a good
idea in theory, this narrower version states, it cannot be implemented
in practice without relying on arbitrary distinctions.27
24. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 279–98, 318–23.
25. Cf. supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. See Raj Chetty & Amy Finkelstein, Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data,
in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 111, 134, 140–41 (Alan J. Auerbach, Raj Chetty,
Martin Feldstein & Emmanuel Saez eds., 2013); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW,
TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 26–27 (1999); Alan B. Krueger
& Bruce D. Meyer, Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance, in 4 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 2327, 2330 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002).
27. See Wilcox, supra note 16, at 886–89.
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This implementation critique assumes the need for arbitrary line
drawing. That assumption has been plausible for decades as the only
significant U.S. transitional assistance policy has been the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program (TAA).28 But the TAA’s reliance on distinctions is irrelevant today. Economists are discovering that it was
not only U.S. trade policy that unintentionally harmed low-skill American workers. Widespread labor market monopsony resulting from
weak enforcement of U.S. competition laws likely harmed these workers as well. The same is likely true of U.S. labor policy, environmental
policy, and the federal government’s acquiescence in the proliferation
of state licensing requirements and local zoning regulation. Given
these findings, the targeted adjustment assistance program needed
today would require much less targeting compared to the TAA.29 Rather than separating workers harmed by free trade from those
harmed by labor market monopsony, automation, poor management,
and so on, this program would target low-skill workers as a group.
Such broad targeting would not suffer from the arbitrariness that bedeviled the TAA for half a century.
Considering U.S. social insurance in light of recent empirical findings brings more reasons for concern. These findings highlight a major, previously unappreciated flaw of U.S. distributional policies. It is
no secret that the U.S. social safety net is highly location-specific. Welfare,30 unemployment insurance,31 health insurance,32 and nutritional
assistance33 vary greatly from state to state. Academics have supported this variation by pointing out the benefits of experimentation,
local accountability, sensitivity to variations in the cost of living, and

28. See J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41922, TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE
(TAA) AND ITS ROLE IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 2 (2013).
29. See generally id.
30. See GENE FALK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) BLOCK GRANT: A PRIMER ON TANF FINANCING AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 5–
8 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32748.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U85
-X3G5]; David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2547
(2005).
31. See JULIE M. WHITTAKER & KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE: PROGRAMS AND BENEFITS 2–4 (2019); JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY 385 (2007).
32. See ALISON MITCHELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN FOCUS: OVERVIEW OF THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION (2018).
33. See RANDY ALISON AUSSENBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP): A PRIMER ON ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS 9–12 (2018).
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responsiveness to taxpayers’ heterogeneous preferences for amenities.34
But even if the implicit assumption that all these benefits outweigh the costs of geographic variation has been plausible until recently, it has become much less plausible today. New research reveals
that economic shocks resulting from trade liberalization, low-skill immigration, and labor market monopsony are highly local. Moreover,
when these shocks occur, labor market adjustments are both difficult
and slow. Adjustment costs that economists assumed away and politicians ignored turned out to be a major burden.
These adjustment costs are not inevitable. The federal government can reduce them in two ways. It can lower the artificial, stateimposed barriers to geographic mobility, and it can replace the current complex, obscure, state-specific income assistance programs
with simpler, transparent, nationally uniform ones.
Given the Article’s conclusions, neither policy experts nor policymakers should feel constrained by the standard prescriptions of the
efficiency-only and no-compensation arguments. Instead, they should
consider the types of policies that follow logically from replacing the
unrealistic assumptions underlying both arguments with plausible
ones. These takeaways are sure to give rise to objections. The Article
considers three important ones.
The first objection is that distributional adjustments advocated
here are uniquely challenging because measuring unintended distributional impacts of government policies is difficult—more difficult, in
particular, than forecasting future changes in employment, inflation,
revenues, and other key economic indicators that routinely affect government policies.
This objection is factually correct. Distributional projections do,
indeed, require more information than forecasts of the standard economic indicators. But greater informational demands do not justify inaction. Our government makes important choices lacking full information about key economic indicators all the time. These predictions
have turned out to be wrong again and again. Yet Congress, the Federal Reserve, and other government actors continue to make decisions
when faced with uncertain projections, adjusting policy when forecasts turn out to be mistaken. Policymakers should follow the same
approach when it comes to distributional adjustments.

34. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation
in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1335–37 (2009); Super, supra note
30, at 2552–60.
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The second objection is that distributional impacts take too long
to reveal themselves—too long, that is, for the government to be able
to respond effectively as these impacts unfold.
Recent evidence appears to support this objection, yet in fact the
opposite conclusion emerges from data. Economists are discovering
only now the effects of trade shocks that occurred two decades ago
and the consequences of changes in the U.S. product and labor markets that took even longer to develop. But the same new research reveals that the reason for these delayed findings is that, to put it bluntly,
“it took a while for academics to catch up.”35 Many long-term trends
were visible in the data at least a decade—and in some cases decades—ago. Paying more attention to these and similar trends going
forward would allow policymakers to respond to unintended distributional impacts much more promptly.
Third, the call for lowering state-imposed barriers to entry and
for a greater uniformity of federal safety net programs runs head-on
into fiscal federalism concerns. The Article’s response is straightforward. We now know about large costs of geographic immobility.
These costs are borne by Americans who are ill-equipped to avoid or
absorb them. Whatever the balance between federal and local provision of social insurance and public assistance has been until now, new
evidence surely weighs in favor of greater centralization and uniformity.
The Article’s arguments unfold in five main parts. Part I summarizes the two distributional arguments and highlights their key assumptions. Part II demonstrates that over the past several decades,
numerous major U.S. policies likely imposed large, concentrated burdens on low-skill American workers without aiming to do so. Part III
argues that the U.S. government largely ignored these new burdens.
Part IV evaluates the assumptions underlying the two distributional
arguments in light of the evidence discussed in Parts II and III, finding
that the assumptions are contradicted by major economic developments of the past several decades. Part V suggests several directions
for policy reform, and Part VI addresses likely counterarguments. The
Conclusion emphasizes the general implications of the Article’s analysis. Reversing the normative thrust of the two distributional arguments shifts the focus of the academic inquiry. Instead of debating

35. Nelson D. Schwartz & Quoctrung Bui, Where Jobs Are Squeezed by Chinese
Trade, Voters Seek Extremes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/04/26/business/economy/where-jobs-are-squeezed-by-chinese-trade-voters
-seek-extremes.html [https://perma.cc/HTU7-2JJQ].
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whether the government should actively shape distributional outcomes in a variety of ways, the question becomes how the government
should do so, given institutional, informational, and political constraints. Finding and refining answers to this question would help policymakers craft better policy responses to economic shocks, whether
these shocks arise from legal reforms, technological transformations,
or a global pandemic.
I. DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AND THEIR ASSUMPTIONS
The close connection between general government programs and
the government’s distributional policies is not a recent discovery. Two
millennia ago Juvenal berated Roman rulers for using bread and circuses to compensate for poor governance.36 More recently, law-andeconomics scholars advanced two arguments about the interaction of
legal rules and distributional policies. The first one limits distributional policies to the tax-and-transfer system. The second one urges
policymakers to ignore losses from legal transitions. Both arguments
are powerful, compelling, and highly influential.37 And both rely on assumptions, as all theories do. This Part presents the two arguments
and their key assumptions in order to re-examine them in light of recent evidence.
A. THE EFFICIENCY-ONLY ARGUMENT
In the words of its main proponents Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell, the efficiency-only argument states that “legal rules should
36. See Bread and Circuses, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bread_
and_circuses [https://perma.cc/BGL6-TLRQ].
37. See, e.g., Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 18, at 2 (referring to the efficiencyonly argument as “the prevailing norm in the law and economics literature”); Tsilly
Dagan, The Global Market for Tax and Legal Rules, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 148, 151–52 (2017)
(describing the efficiency-only argument as a “canonical claim”); Matthew Dimick, The
Law and Economics of Redistribution, 15 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 559, 560 (2019) (calling
Kaplow and Shavell’s article articulating the efficiency-only argument “seminal—and,
for many, debate-concluding”); Zachary Liscow, Are Court Orders Sticky? Evidence on
Distributional Impacts from School Finance Litigation, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 4
(2018) (referring to the efficiency-only argument as the “traditional economic analysis
of legal rules”); Logue & Avraham, supra note 18, at 158 (stating “we believe it is a safe
bet that a majority of legal economists hold the . . . view” that the efficiency-only argument is correct); Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics
of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 394 (2010) (“For many years, the traditional
law and economics literature advocated strongly against legal transition relief.”);
Revesz, supra note 18, at 1510–11 (demonstrating the influence of the efficiency-only
argument in legal academy); Sanchirico, supra note 18 (referring to the “broad consensus within law and economics that legal rules should be set solely on the basis of efficiency”).
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not be adjusted to disfavor the rich and favor the poor in order to redistribute income, because the income tax and transfer system is a
more efficient means of redistribution.”38 The argument begins by
noting that in general, any given distributional objective may be accomplished by changing either legal rules (understood broadly as any
rule “other than those that define the income tax and welfare system”39) or tax rules (understood as all rules that do define the tax and
welfare system). But any transfer from the rich to the poor distorts
incentives to earn income. When this transfer is carried out through
the tax-and-transfer system, this distortion gives rise to the standard
deadweight loss of taxation. What the efficiency-only argument adds
is the insight that if the same transfer is accomplished through a legal
rule rather a tax rule, the same distortion gives rise to the same
deadweight loss.40 But in addition, embedding redistribution in legal
rules “also creates inefficiencies in the activities regulated by the legal
rules.”41
In other words, shifting distributional adjustments from the tax
system to the legal system does nothing to reduce the efficiency cost
of redistribution but adds a new costly distortion. So nothing is gained
but some efficiency is lost when legal, rather than tax, rules are altered
to reflect distributional concerns.
Importantly, the efficiency-only argument is not an argument
against redistribution. Rather it is an argument against a particular
form of redistribution. As Shavell noted in his original presentation of
the argument,
one’s attitude toward the result under discussion will depend on his expectation that the income tax would be (or could be) altered in response to
changes in legal rules whenever these changes resulted in a “sufficiently important” shift in the distribution of income.42

If we gloss over the difference between “would be” and “could be” in
the quoted passage, Shavell conditions the normative takeaway from
the efficiency-only argument on the expectation about the offsetting
tax-and-transfer adjustment.43 Similarly, David Weisbach explains
that he supports the efficiency-only argument
38. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying
the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
821, 821 (2000).
39. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 14, at 667 n.1.
40. See generally id. at 667–68.
41. Id. at 668.
42. Shavell, supra note 14, at 417.
43. Glossing over this difference treats the argument charitably. Writing later
jointly with Kaplow, Shavell explains that the critique of the efficiency-only argument
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not out of lack of concern for distribution or equality, [but because] there is
a better method of addressing these concerns. . . . We should, therefore, use
the tax system rather than legal rules to address income inequality, and, correspondingly, legal rules should not systematically favor the poor.44

These statements—as well as the overall logic of the efficiencyonly argument—demonstrate that the assumption about the tax-andtransfer system adjustment carries a lot of weight. So much weight, in
fact, that if the assumption is reversed, the conclusion must be reversed as well. If tax rules do not take distribution into account, or fail
to do so adequately, then legal rules should reflect distributional considerations at least in some cases.45 After all, the argument’s proponents support redistributive transfers. If these transfers cannot be
carried out through the tax system, the only alternative is to redistribute through the legal system, imperfect as it may be for accomplishing
distributive goals.
The efficiency-only argument’s other important assumption is
about the efficiency of legal rules. Various articulations of the argument differ significantly in the importance of that assumption. A
weaker version states that “any regime with an inefficient legal rule
can be replaced by a regime with an efficient legal rule and a modified
income tax system designed so that every person is made better off.”46
This is a statement about possibilities. Hypothetical efficiency of hypothetical rules is achieved by an imaginary change in the tax system.
Other versions, however, are much more assertive. “[R]edistribution through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution
through the income tax system and typically is less efficient.”47
“[L]egal rules should not be designed to redistribute to the poor . . . [because] there is a better method of addressing these concerns.”48 These
statements can be fairly read as addressing actual legal and tax rules,
“would be moot if the income tax system . . . could be used freely” to redistribute.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 14, at 667 (emphasis added). I believe that if Kaplow and
Shavell knew for certain that redistribution through the tax system is possible (could
happen) but is never done, they would not insist on ignoring distributional issues in
the design of legal rules.
44. Weisbach, supra note 14, at 439.
45. Weisbach does not go quite as far, but he does conclude that “[w]ithout the
tax system, [the efficiency-only argument’s] conclusion would not necessarily hold and
legal rules might optimally be set to redistribute.” Id. at 439–40. Weisbach’s use of
“might” may be a stylistic choice rather than substantive doubt. A few sentences after
the quoted sentence he asks: “Why might we want to redistribute income?” Id. at 440.
Yet his quote in the text above leaves little doubt that he believes in redistribution.
46. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 14, at 669 (emphasis omitted).
47. Id. at 667 (emphasis added).
48. Weisbach, supra note 14, at 439 (emphasis added).
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or as calls for actual reforms of the existing regulatory architecture.
And in fact, many legal scholars do interpret the arguments as policy
advice.49
But what if the actual legal rules are inefficient, or if there is significant uncertainty about their efficiency? And what if there is no
plausible argument that the tax rules are anywhere close to optimal
either?50 Then there is no reason to prefer tax rules or legal rules as
vehicles for redistribution on efficiency grounds. In fact, as is well
known, changing legal rules to reflect distributional considerations in
these circumstances may increase—not reduce—their efficiency by
introducing a distortion that offsets some other, pre-existing distortion.51 So if the efficiency-only argument is taken as a statement that
has real-world significance, the assumption about efficiency of existing legal rules becomes critical. And again, reversing this assumption
reverses the argument’s takeaway.
The efficiency-only argument’s proponents were always clear
that the argument is subject to qualifications,52 one of which is particularly relevant for our purposes. As Kaplow and Shavell explain, tax
rules may not clearly dominate legal rules as a redistributive mechanism if there is unobservable heterogeneity within income groups.53
49. See, e.g., Fennell & McAdams, supra note 18, at 1062 (“Our sense today is that
both the K&S result and the policy advice have become the conventional wisdom, at
least among many law professors who employ economic analysis.”).
50. This is, quite likely, the case. See Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax
Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (2013). Kaplow has shown that the logic of
the efficiency-only argument holds even if income tax is not optimal. See Louis Kaplow,
On the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation Even When Income Taxation Is Not Optimal, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1235 (2006). However, the income tax in Kaplow’s proof is a labor
income tax that has little resemblance to the actual U.S. tax system.
51. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV.
ECON. STUD. 11, 12 (1956) (“[I]n a situation in which there exist many constraints which
prevent the fulfillment of the Parteian [sic] optimum conditions, the removal of any
one constraint may affect welfare or efficiency either by raising it, by lowering it, or by
leaving it unchanged.”). Half a century later, Richard Lipsey stuck to his guns. See Richard G. Lipsey, Reflections on the General Theory of Second Best at Its Golden Jubilee, 14
INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 349, 358 (2007) (“Are there general policy rules for piecemeal
improvements? My answer . . . is ‘no.’”).
52. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 14, at 669, 680–81 (discussing the possibility that certain legal disputes are complements or substitutes to income-generating
activities); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 38, at 827–28 (pointing out that qualifications
do not automatically lead to a conclusion that legal rules should reflect distributive
concerns); Shavell, supra note 14, at 417 (making the offsetting tax system adjustment
assumption).
53. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 14, at 674 n.7; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note
38, at 827–32. If the heterogeneity is observable, Kaplow and Shavell point out that tax
rules should be adjusted to take it into account. See id. at 828–29 n.18.
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If such heterogeneity exists, the analysis becomes complicated. Efficiency-enhancing distributional adjustment may turn out to favor the
rich or the poor depending on considerations reflecting unknown empirical facts.54 If, however, unobservable heterogeneity is such that
changing legal rules is likely to have desirable distributional effects,
Kaplow and Shavell’s logic supports these adjustments.
To summarize, the efficiency-only argument states that legal
rules should not be used for redistribution, which should be achieved
through the tax-and-transfer system. To the extent that this argument
is viewed as policy-relevant, it relies on three assumptions, the first
two being particularly important. First, the tax-and-transfer system
actually is adjusted to reflect distributional objectives. Second, legal
rules are (or can realistically be made) efficient. And third, there is no
unobserved within-income-group heterogeneity that may be harnessed to improve distributional outcomes by adjusting a legal rule.
Reversing each of these assumptions would reverse the efficiencyonly argument’s policy takeaway. Rather than excluding distributional considerations from the design of legal rules, the argument’s
logic would lead policymakers to include these considerations and, in
some cases, change legal rules to reflect distributional concerns.
B. THE NO-COMPENSATION ARGUMENT
The U.S. government enacts new laws and changes the existing
ones all the time. These changes often create winners and losers. Yet
the government generally does not expropriate the gains, nor does it
compensate the losses.
The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permits the
government to impose an income tax, that is, to take taxpayers’ money
without giving anything back, at least not directly.55 Moreover, the income tax schedule is progressive, burdening high-income taxpayers
disproportionately. Congress frequently changes tax rules, including
the progressivity of the tax system. Yet few would argue today that the
income tax, its changes, and its progressive rate schedule are unconstitutional.56 The Constitution also has the takings clause, which requires compensation for a specific taking of private property.57 Occasionally, courts find that government regulation amounts to a
54. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 38, at 827–32.
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
56. The most developed objection to taxes as unconstitutional uncompensated
takings of property comes from Richard Epstein. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 295–303 (1985).
57. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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“regulatory taking.”58 But the small number of such cases reinforces
the general point that the government owes no compensation when
its changing rules give rise to unintended economic burdens.
This is as it should be according to the no-compensation argument. The argument comes from the literature on so-called “legal
transitions” and from long-standing critiques of actual transitional assistance. The theoretical prong of the argument has been developed
by Kaplow in its general form,59 and its logic is straightforward.
Government changes legal rules all the time, the argument goes.
These changes come in many forms—from property takings to regulation, deregulation, judicial decisions, and so on. Many of these
changes produce “incidental”60 winners and losers.61 The possibility
of incurring a loss from government action imposes risk on individuals, and risk-averse individuals would prefer to mitigate it.62
But if the government compensates transitional losers, it would
eliminate private parties’ incentives to take into account, probabilistically, all “real costs and benefits of their decisions.”63 “The belief that
market solutions to problems of risk and incentives are generally
more efficient than government remedies implies that the market response to legal transitions is similarly more efficient than government

58. For a review of caselaw, see, for example, Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2193–95 (2004), which discusses regulatory
takings doctrine.
59. Michael Graetz was first to offer reasons why the government should not compensate transitional losers, but Graetz’s analysis was limited to tax law and admitted
exceptions. See Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income
Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977). Kaplow, in contrast, argued that in general,
the government should ignore transitional losses resulting from government actions.
See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 509.
60. Kaplow, supra note 15, at 519. By “incidental” Kaplow meant “unintended.”
Unfortunately, another common meaning of this term is “minor.” Incidental, MERRIAMWEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
incidental [https://perma.cc/CD9R-35FJ] (defining “incidental” as “being likely to ensue as a chance or minor consequence” and “occurring merely by chance or without
intention or calculation”).
61. For a fuller list of examples of changing rules, see Kaplow, supra note 15, at
517.
62. See id. at 527.
63. Id. at 529.
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transitional relief.”64 The market solutions that Kaplow has in mind
are private insurance and financial diversification.65
Note that Kaplow’s argument emphasizes—rather than dismisses—the importance of risk spreading and insurance. His point is
simply that in the context of transitional gains and losses, the best
means of addressing risk are private rather than social.
The no-compensation argument also has a more practical prong.
Even if the government did try to compensate transitional losers, the
argument goes, the effort would fail. Imagine that the government decided to alleviate economic losses incurred by U.S. businesses and
workers negatively affected by trade liberalization. Difficult questions
would immediately arise.
Say a U.S. auto assembly plant moves from Ohio to Mexico after
the United States and Mexico sign a free-trade agreement. Surely the
plant’s laid off workers suffer a loss, and they seem to be deserving of
government compensation. But what about the workers at the plant’s
suppliers that go bankrupt in the wake of the plant’s relocation—
should they be compensated as well? And what about those working
at a diner near the plant that loses most of its customers, a car repair
shop in town that suffers a precipitous drop in business, or a childcare
center that closes because laid off autoworkers stay home with their
kids?66 It is also not clear why workers laid off because their jobs
moved to Mexico are more deserving of assistance than workers who
lost their jobs to automation, recession, or just poor management.
Even for the workers who clearly suffered from trade liberalization,
measuring their loss would be no easy task. Should we assume, for instance, that these workers will never get another job? Should we account for cheaper Mexican-made goods that these workers will buy . . .
with whatever money they have left?

64. Id. at 522. While Kaplow avoids saying that “the belief” he is describing is his
own, he does point out that governmental “adoption of mechanisms to deal with all
conceivable market risks would be tantamount to government displacement of the
market economy.” Id. at 535.
65. “If this analogy between market and government risks is accepted, transition
policy should vanish as a separate concern.” Id. at 535.
66. To verify the realism of these hypotheticals, see, for example, AMY GOLDSTEIN,
JANESVILLE: AN AMERICAN STORY (2017), which details the long-term aftermath of what
happened to the people and town of Janesville, Wisconsin, after the local General Motors assembly plant, responsible for the jobs of around 9,000 locals and which had a
significant influence on the community’s culture, shut its doors in 2008.
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Clair Wilcox raised these concerns about trade adjustment assistance in the pages of American Economic Review in 1950.67 Scholars,68
policy experts,69 and politicians70 repeated these arguments ever
since. The persistence of these objections may explain the political
vulnerability of the TAA and its resulting ineffectiveness.71
The assumptions underlying the no-compensation argument are
easy to see. The argument holds only if transitional losses are foreseeable and if private insurance and market diversification are, indeed,
available. Transitional assistance programs require arbitrary distinctions only if they are narrowly targeted. If these assumptions fail to
hold, the conclusions change to the opposite of those being advanced.
Large, unforeseeable, uninsurable, and undiversifiable losses to people’s livelihoods are the classic reason for social insurance.72 This is as
true when the losses are caused by changes in government policies as
it is when they are not. And if a transitional assistance program need
not rely on questionable distinctions, the arbitrariness objection loses
its force.
***
One may view the two distributional arguments as pure thought
experiments with little relevance to the world in which we live. Or one
may think of them as strictly formal statements with a structure of “if
and only if X, then Y.” But the argument’s proponents appear to have
greater ambitions, as revealed by numerous instances when the arguments read like direct prescriptions for policymakers.73 Perhaps more
importantly, both arguments have come to be viewed as guides for actual policy reforms.74 It is this connection to real-world policymaking
67. See Wilcox, supra note 16, at 884–89.
68. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & M. Marit Rehavi, Trade Adjustment Assistance, J.
ECON. PERSPS., Spring 2004, at 239, 251–52 (raising questions about who should get
transition relief under TAA); Masur & Nash, supra note 37, at 441–42 (raising same
questions about the reach of any transition assistance program).
69. See HORNBECK, supra note 28; ALDEN, supra note 7, at 117 (describing the 1954
report of President Eisenhower’s Randall Commission).
70. ALDEN, supra note 7, at 121 (citing President Reagan).
71. See id. at 116–22. The same arguments had the same effect in the context of a
proposed transitional assistance program for coal miners affected by the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990. See Revesz, supra note 18, at 1546–50.
72. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 26.
73. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 47–48, 65.
74. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, David Fortus & Kyle D. Logue, Revisiting the Roles of
Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2004) (explaining economists’ belief “that has become the
new conventional wisdom: that income (or wealth) redistribution is always better accomplished through the tax-and-transfer system than through the legal system”); Ilan
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that puts so much weight on the assumptions underlying these arguments. As this Part explains, these assumptions are far from self-evident. It is time to examine how plausible they are.
II. THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES
The two distributional arguments entered academic debates
more than three decades ago.75 To evaluate their continuing significance we need to understand what has happened in the U.S. economy
since then.
This Part presents the latest evidence that bears on this question.
The evidence shows that major government policies have produced
unintended distributional burdens. It is increasingly likely that these
burdens were large, unanticipated, concentrated, persistent, and fell
on the same group of Americans who are not well-positioned to absorb or deflect these burdens.
A. TRADE
One can go back many decades, if not centuries, in search of the
origins of the economic analysis of trade.76 But the crucial period for
our purposes is the 1980s and 1990s. Free trade was all the rage at
the time.77 Developing countries were unilaterally lowering their historically high trade barriers.78 They also started to enter into regional
Benshalom, Rethinking International Distributive Justice: Fairness as Insurance, 31 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 267, 308 (2013) (noting that “[t]here is a strong case for the division-of-labor
approach [implementing the efficiency-only argument] in a domestic setting” but not
internationally); John Brooks, Brian Galle & Brendan Maher, Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1271–72 (2018) (considering the efficiency-only argument in connection with the design of the Affordable Care Act); Dagan,
supra note 37 (discussing the efficiency-only argument in connection with evaluating
the architecture of the international tax and legal rules); Fennell & McAdams, supra
note 18, at 1054 (explaining how a court or any other institutional actor would resolve
a dispute following the efficiency-only argument); Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 213 (2003)
(advising policymakers to follow the logic of the no-compensation argument for corporations but not individuals).
75. See Graetz, supra note 59; Hylland & Zeckhauser, supra note 14; Kaplow, supra
note 15; Shavell, supra note 14.
76. See generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF U.S.
TRADE POLICY (2017) (providing a detailed analysis of the complete history and development of U.S. trade policy, from colonial times through 2017).
77. Dani Rodrik, The Rush to Free Trade in the Developing World: Why So Late?
Why Now? Will It Last? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 3947, 1992),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w3947/w3947.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NP46-F4H6].
78. Id.
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trade agreements with developed countries, including, of course, the
United States.79 The United States entered into NAFTA in 1994, continued to renew China’s most-favorite-nation trade status throughout
the 1990s, and negotiated the terms of China’s accession to the WTO,
which took place in 2001.80
At about the same time, trade economists became concerned that
trade liberalization—something they supported almost uniformly—
may be contributing to wage inequality that started to reveal itself in
the data.81 In fact, the foundational trade theory of comparative advantage, which Paul Samuelson once called the only proposition in
economics that is at once true and non-trivial,82 predicts that trade
liberalization will increase inequality in the developed world.83 However, after a vigorous inquiry, trade economists concluded that technology rather than trade was to blame, and turned their attention to
studying the effects of trade liberalization in the developing world.84
Not every economist was equally convinced. Dani Rodrik warned
about the distributive effects of free trade in an influential 1997
book.85 He pointed out that “the basic models of trade theory [show]
that the net gains [from trade] and the magnitudes of redistribution

79. See Lorenzo Caliendo & Fernando Parro, Estimates of the Trade and Welfare
Effects of NAFTA, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 4 n.7 (2015).
80. See Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, China’s Rise: How It Took On the U.S. at the
WTO, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 131–32.
81. See David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 205,
206 (2016).
82. See Rodrik, supra note 77, at 1.
83. Id. at 2–5.
84. See Autor et al., supra note 81 (“After vigorous inquiry, concern about the labor-market consequences of trade receded. Economists did not find trade to have had
substantial adverse distributional effects in developed economies, either for low-skill
workers specifically or for import-competing factors and sectors more generally.”);
Pinelopi Goldberg, Introduction to TRADE AND INEQUALITY at x (Pinelopi Goldberg ed.,
2015) (“Until recently, the consensus among economists had been that trade had a relatively small effect on inequality. This consensus emerged in the late 1990s after
nearly a decade of studies by both labor and trade economists . . . . As a result of [the
discovered] evidence, interest in the relationship between trade and inequality in developed countries subsided.”).
85. See DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? (1997).
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are directly linked . . . . The larger the net gains, the larger the redistribution.”86 Others expressed concerns as well.87 But those concerns
were based on theory and simulations, not on rigorous empirical evidence.88 So distributional objections to free trade remained on the periphery of the economics profession. And the objectors—even the
most prominent ones—encountered considerable opprobrium.89
It took one or two decades for trade economists to return their
focus to the United States and other developed countries. Yet even today—and despite recent assertions that “now there is a large body of
evidence . . . about the economic effects of NAFTA on the three countries”90—there is just one published empirical study of the distributional impact of NAFTA in the United States.91 Its main finding is that
blue-collar workers in industries and locations most exposed to
NAFTA (that is, where tariffs went from high to low) bore a very high
cost.92 Their wage growth over a decade was seventeen percentage
points (not percent!)93 lower compared to industries where tariffs
were already low and NAFTA changed little.94 Even low-wage workers
outside of the affected industries but living in locations where those
industries were prevalent experienced substantially lower wage

86. Interview with Dani Rodrik, WORLD ECON. ASS’N NEWSL. (World Econ. Ass’n,
U.K.), Apr. 2013, at 9, 11, https://www.worldeconomicsassociation.org/files/
newsletters/Issue3-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KHS-ER9J].
87. See Justino De La Cruz, David Riker & Bennet Voorhees, Econometric Estimates
of the Effects of NAFTA: A Review of the Literature (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Off. of Econ.
Working Paper No. 2013-12A, 2013).
88. See id.
89. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 135–37, 143–45 (raising some doubts about
the benefits of globalization and concluding that “mainstream trade economists have
insufficiently noticed the drastic change in mean U.S. incomes and in inequalities
among different U.S. classes”); Avinash Dixit & Gene Grossman, Comment, The Limits
of Free Trade, J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2005, at 241, 242; Paul A. Samuelson, Response
from Paul A. Samuelson, 19 J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2005, at 242, 243.
90. De La Cruz et al., supra note 87, at 2.
91. See Shushanik Hakobyan & John McLaren, Looking for Local Labor-Market Effects of NAFTA, 98 REV. ECON. & STAT. 728, 728–29 (2016) (observing that “economists
to date have not provided an answer to the question of whether NAFTA has indeed had
the effects ascribed to it by its opponents,” who argued—without evidence at the
time—that NAFTA “has destroyed millions of U.S. jobs”).
92. Id. at 733–35.
93. For example, if wage growth during a period would have been 20% but some
event reduced that growth by 15%, the actual wage growth would be 17% (0.2*(10.15)). In contrast, if the same event reduced wage growth by 15 percentage points the
resulting growth would be just 5% (0.2%-0.15%).
94. See id. at 729.
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growth.95 College-educated workers, in contrast, saw no statistically
significant wage changes.96
The so-called China Shock has received more attention, at least in
part because its empirical analysis is less vulnerable to endogeneity
concerns.97 Over the past several years, a group of leading economists
has published several influential papers arguing that China’s accession to the WTO accounts for one-quarter of the aggregate decline in
U.S. manufacturing employment98 and a loss of between 2 and 2.4 million jobs overall between 1999 and 2011.99 In addition to outright job
losses, China’s entry into the WTO reduced wages of those low-skill
workers who managed to keep their jobs.100 As with NAFTA, these
losses were highly concentrated by industry and location. And as with
NAFTA, the empirical findings are recent.101
The disconcerting view of China’s accession to the WTO is not
universally accepted. Zhi Wang and colleagues argue in a recent working paper that David Autor, Daron Acemoglu, Gordon Hanson and others got the China Shock backwards.102 Accounting for what the paper
calls “supply chains,” Wang and colleagues conclude that trade with
China has led to “a net job increase of 1.27% (as a share of working

95. Id.
96. Id. at 730.
97. See Autor et al., supra note 81, at 210.
98. See David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM. ECON. REV.
2121, 2121 (2013); Autor et al., supra note 81, at 213–14 (offering reasons why China’s
accession to the WTO—rather than China’s economic development in general—is the
likely reason for U.S. job losses); Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott, The Surprisingly
Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 1632, 1632 (2016)
(linking an 18% “plung[e]” in U.S. manufacturing employment between 2001 and 2007
to the U.S. grant to China of the permanent normal trade relations that became effective
on China’s accession to the WTO).
99. See Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson & Brendan
Price, Import Competition and the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s, 34 J. LAB.
ECON. S141, S141 (2015).
100. See Autor et al., supra note 81, at 229.
101. See Goldberg, supra note 84, at xiv (noting that Autor and colleagues’ The
China Syndrome, supra note 98, was the first paper to report large effects of the China
Shock).
102. See Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei, Xinding Yu & Kunfu Zhu, Re-Examining the Effects of Trading with China on Local Labor Markets: A Supply Chain Perspective 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24886, 2018), https://www.nber.org/
system/files/working_papers/w24886/w24886.pdf [https://perma.cc/833U-ZQT7]
(noting that “incorporating a supply chain perspective . . . can overturn the received
wisdom in the literature” (citing Autor et al., supra note 98)).
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age cohort)”103 and to higher wages for 75% of the workers in an average region (average in terms of exposure to Chinese competition).104 Autor and co-authors disagree, arguing that upstream effects
are negative while downstream effects are “small and insignificant in
the aggregate.”105 But importantly, Wang and colleagues agree with
Autor and co-authors that the majority of workers with less-than-college education have suffered wage losses, and that these losses have
been particularly large (15–25% declines) for the lowest deciles of
wage distribution.106 While this bottom-line conclusion is not unanimous,107 most high-quality econometric research of the past several
years reveals large and geographically concentrated negative effects
of trade liberalization on American blue-collar workers.108
B. IMMIGRATION
In terms of their political significance, distributional effects of U.S.
trade policies rival only those of immigration. Economists have been
studying how immigrants affect wages and jobs of American workers
for a long time.109 There is a vigorous debate among leading labor
economists about the effect of low-skill immigration on wages of low103. Id. at 2.
104. See id.
105. Autor et al., supra note 81, at 228 n.33, 234. In contrast, Wang and co-authors
conclude that “the job gains from the downstream channel are not only statistically
significant but also economically powerful enough to more than offset the combined
negative effects from direct competition and the upstream channel.” Wang et al., supra
note 102, at 2.
106. See Wang et al., supra note 101, at 30, 54 fig.6.
107. Yet another recent paper argues that “the finding that the China shock is prorich is fragile, as it depends on how non-labor income is apportioned across groups.”
Simon Galle, Andrés Rodríguez-Clare & Moises Yi, Slicing the Pie: Quantifying the Aggregate and Distributional Effects of Trade 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 23737, 2017), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/
w23737/w23737.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EGN-QU43].
108. Another recent paper shows that the same areas that mostly suffered from
trade liberalization also benefited from it. As a result, perhaps surprisingly, repealing
NAFTA would hurt workers in the same locations that suffered when NAFTA was enacted. Raphael A. Auer, Bathélémy Bonadio & Andrei A. Levchenko, The Economics and
Politics of Revoking NAFTA, 68 IMF ECON. REV. 230, 232–33 (2020). The key finding for
our purposes is that some workers did suffer from NAFTA, even though other workers
living nearby gained from it. On the other hand, the paper’s result is difficult to reconcile with Hakobyan and McLaren who found that low-skill workers in the entire areas
impacted by NAFTA were negatively affected. See Hakobyan & McLaren, supra note 91.
109. See Shelby D. Gerking & John H. Mutti, Costs and Benefits of Illegal Immigration: Key Issues for Government Policy, 61 SOC. SCI. Q. 71, 72 (1980); Jean B. Grossman,
The Substitutability of Natives and Immigrants in Production, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 596,
600–02 (1982).
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skill Americans. “[T]he existing literature demonstrates that it is quite
difficult to isolate the impact of immigration on wages. Even more
problematic, it turns out that the evidence often depends on researcher choices about how to frame the empirical analysis.”110
George Borjas and co-authors have produced a large body of
work demonstrating that low-skill immigration depresses wages and
employment of low-skill American workers.111 This conclusion seemingly follows from the basic analysis of supply and demand.112 Yet David Card and others have been arguing that the effects, if any, are
small,113 emphasizing that Borjas’s “‘revisionist’ view of recent U.S.
immigration is overly pessimistic.”114
As with trade, the warning signs came decades ago. An early red
flag appeared in a 1996 study by Borjas, Richard Freeman, and Lawrence Katz (all leading economists).115 They found “negative relations
between immigration-induced changes in supply and native wages.
[Moreover,] immigration contributed more to the decline in the relative earnings of high-school dropouts than trade, while both modestly
reduced the earnings of high-school workers relative to college workers.”116
110. Jason Anastasopoulos, George J. Borjas, Gavin G. Cook & Michael Lachanski,
Job Vacancies and Immigration: Evidence from Pre- and Post-Mariel Miami 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper 24580, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/
files/working_papers/w24580/revisions/w24580.rev0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W38
-MFP2].
111. See id. at 5–6; George Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping:
Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1355
(2003).
112. As Paul Samuelson notes, “[i]f mass immigration into the United States of similar workers to [low-skill, low-education American workers] had been permitted to actually take place, mainstream economists could not avoid predicting a substantial drop
in wages of this native group.” Samuelson, supra note 2, at 144.
113. See David Card & John DiNardo, Do Immigrant Inflows Lead to Native Outflows,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 360 (2000); David Card, Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the
Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher Immigration, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 22 (2001); Giovanni
Peri & Vasil Yasenov, The Labor Market Effects of a Refugee Wave: Applying the Synthetic Control Method to the Mariel Boatlift (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 21801, 2017), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21801/
w21801.pdf [https://perma.cc/586L-VP4M]; Ethan G. Lewis, Local Open Economics
Within the US: How Do Industries Respond to Immigration? (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila.,
Working Paper No. 04-1, 2003).
114. David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?, 115 ECON. J. F300, F300
(2005).
115. See George Borjas, Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz, Searching for the
Effect of Immigration on the Labor Market, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 246 (1996).
116. Id. Needless to say, the trade data studied by Borjas and co-authors did not
include the effects of NAFTA or the China Shock.
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Twenty years of subsequent research have not brought a consensus among labor economists. Summarizing the literature, Eric Posner
and Glen Weyl highlight the continuing disagreements:
There is significant evidence that immigration reduces the wages of native
workers whose backgrounds are similar to those of migrants. For example,
illegal immigration to the United States from Mexico and Central America
tends to hurt native workers with low education and weak language skills.
However, the effects of migration on the broader labor markets are murkier.
Some scholars believe that the native workers are in aggregate harmed, albeit
only to a limited extent. Others argue that effects are negligible or even that
most workers may benefit . . . .117

The disagreement between the two camps is so fundamental, that
Card, Borjas, and others continue to debate the consequences of a single event—the Mariel boatlift—that took place almost forty years ago.
Card finds that the boatlift had virtually no impact on local wages.118
Borjas finds that wages of “native” high school dropouts fell by ten to
thirty percent.119
In the view of the National Academy of Sciences, the weight of evidence is shifting toward a greater concern about the effects of lowskill immigration. Revisiting its comprehensive 1997 analysis of economic and fiscal consequences of immigration, the Academy reached
the following conclusion in 2017:
At that time [that is, in 1997], the authoring panel’s conclusion that “immigration has had a relatively small adverse impact on the wage and employment opportunities of competing native groups” seemed to summarize well
what the academic studies indicated. However, the intensive research on this
topic over the past two decades . . . displays a much wider variation in the
estimates of the wage impact on natives who are most likely to compete with
immigrants, with some studies suggesting sizable negative wage effects on
native high school dropouts. . . . Thus, the evidence suggests that groups comparable to the immigrants in terms of their skill may experience a wage reduction as a result of immigration-induced increases in labor supply, although there are still a number of studies that suggest small to zero effects.120

117. ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 143 (2018) (citing sources). For a similar assessment see
ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 159 (2003),
which notes that entry of “hard-working and well-meaning people from developing
countries . . . would in many cases harm the interests of the indigenous population,
who do have rights of citizenship that must be honored.”
118. See David Card, The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market,
43 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 245 (1990).
119. See George J. Borjas, The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: A Reappraisal, 70 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 1077, 1077 (2017).
120. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF
IMMIGRATION 247–48 (Francine D. Blau & Christopher Mackie eds., 2017).
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The latest research using the highest quality data explains why the
earlier studies that found small effects may be misleading. These studies were capable of detecting only average effects, and averages
masked the existence of both significant winners and significant losers.121 A more granular look shows that low-skill Americans “who appear to be displaced by immigrant labor and move out of their local
labor market” are the losers.122 So while the economic losses of lowskill Americans exposed to an influx of low-skill immigrants are still
debated, the losses are likely and also likely to be significant.
C. MARKET CONCENTRATION
Economists studying the growth of economic inequality have
been focused on trade and immigration for some time. More recently,
another trio of explanations has entered the distributional debates:
the rise of concentration in product, labor, and capital markets.
The numbers are striking. Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout, and Gabriel Unger show that since 1980, product markups (profits that firms
capture by setting prices of the goods they sell in excess of costs)123
increased from 21% to 61%.124
The increase suggests a dramatic rise in market power that could
explain the decrease in labor and capital shares in national income,
the decline of low-skill wages, and the drop in labor force participation, the authors conclude.125 Robert Hall examined markups in specific industries (rather than in the entire economy), and confirmed
121. Joseph Price, Christian vom Lehn & Riley Wilson, The Winners and Losers of
Immigration: Evidence from Linked Historical Data 1–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 27156, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_
papers/w27156/w27156.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7VV-SNXZ] (investigating novel
panel comprising individual-level data on location, occupation, employment, and income of workers affected by impact of new immigrants during 1910s and 1920s).
122. Id. (quote taken from Abstract).
123. A “markup” is what a firm charges above its marginal cost. See Jan De Loecker,
Jan Eeckhout & Gabriel Unger, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications 135 Q.J. ECON. 561, 562 (2020). In a perfectly competitive economy the markup
is zero. See Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 556 (2018) (“The markup equals the difference
between the monopoly price and the competitive price, and thus serves as a natural
gauge of market power . . . .”).
124. See De Loecker et al., supra note 123, at 561.
125. See id. at 563, 566. Labor share of national income is “the fraction of economic
output that accrues to workers as compensation in exchange for their labor,” MICHAEL
D. GIANDREA & SHAWN SPRAGUE, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., MONTHLY LAB. REV., ESTIMATING
THE U.S. LABOR SHARE (2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/pdf/
estimating-the-us-labor-share.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WQF-M7WN], or “a share of labor income in total sales or value added,” David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz,
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their rise, revealing a “substantial growth in market power,” though
not as dramatic as De Loecker and co-authors suggest.126
Another recent blockbuster paper by Simcha Barkai argues that
economists have completely missed the rise of abnormal returns to
capital (economic windfalls or rents127) by simply assuming them
away based on empirical findings from the 1980s.128 In the meantime,
rents grew to $14,000 per employee in 2014—almost half of median
personal income in the United States.129 Barkai argues that decline in
competition explains the rise of windfall profits.130
These findings are consistent with yet another recent study by
Gustavo Grullon and colleagues who find that seventy-five percent of
U.S. industries have experienced an increase in concentration levels
over the last two decades.131 “[T]o the extent industries look more like
oligopolies than perfectly competitive markets, they will generate
economic rents. . . . [S]uch rents reflect an erosion of the surplus that
would otherwise accrue to consumers in a competitive market.”132
Christina Patterson & John Van Reenan, Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share,
107 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 180, 185 (2017), or just labor’s share of Gross Domestic Product, see Autor et al., supra, at 180. When market power increases, whether
due to monopoly or monopsony power, rents (the share of total output the firms obtain
because of their market power) rise, while capital share (the share of output that firms
obtain due to their productive activities) and labor share fall. See Naidu et al., supra
note 123, at 565–66.
126. Robert E. Hall, New Evidence on the Markup of Prices over Marginal Costs and
the Role of Mega-Firms in the US Economy 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 24574, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/
w24574/w24574.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4GT-ZQWF].
127. “Economic rents are the return to a factor of production in excess of what is
required to keep it in the market. . . . By definition, they are excessive returns to market
activity that would have occurred anyway in their absence.” Jason Furman & Peter Orszag, A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in Inequality, in TOWARD A
JUST SOCIETY: JOSEPH STIGLITZ AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMICS 19, 20–21 (Martin
Guzman ed., 2018).
128. See Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares, 75 J. FIN. 2421, 2458
(2020) (“Past empirical estimates of small economic pure profits together with the potential theoretical advantage of indirectly inferring capital costs have led many researchers to prefer the assumption of zero pure profits over the direct measurement
of capital costs.”). The assumption of zero rents was consistent with a broader view
among economists, especially applied economists, that markets are perfectly competitive and no firms have monopoly power. See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 117, at 23–
29.
129. See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 117, at 39.
130. See Barkai, supra note 128, at 2422.
131. Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming
More Concentrated?, 23 REV. FIN. 697, 697 (2019).
132. Furman & Orszag, supra note 127, at 35.
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Grullon and co-authors suggest that lax enforcement of antitrust laws
may explain the increase.133 Economists in the Obama White House
had similar concerns.134 Recent econometric research “has found tacit
collusion to be unexpectedly prevalent.”135 Given the “revolution” that
re-oriented antitrust law towards efficiency and away from other social objectives over the past decades, the drop of some merger reviews
by the FTC and DOJ, and a sharp decline in antitrust challenges, these
concerns seem well-founded.136
One should not confuse concerns with consensus. Some of the papers just discussed are unpublished, and other scholars have already
raised objections.137 For example, an increase in industry concentration may reflect an increase in market power or it may not.138 A dramatic increase in markups suggests an even greater decline of the labor share than the actual one.139 No doubt, the debates about the

133. See Grullon et al., supra note 131, at 734–35.
134. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ISSUE BRIEF, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER 1 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5E4G-VBF9].
135. Steven Berry, Martin Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, Do Increasing Markups
Matter? Lessons from Empirical Industrial Organization, J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2019,
at 44, 60.
136. See John Kwoka, Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Response to the
FTC Critique (Mar. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2947814 [https://perma.cc/K6AC-YSA8] (describing the decline in antitrust enforcement); Thomas G. Wollman, Stealth Consolidation: Evidence from an Amendment to the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 1 AM. ECON. REV.: INSIGHTS 77, 78–79 (2019) (concluding that the
2000 amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act that increased
the threshold for premerger review led to a large increase in mergers between competitors). Inadequate enforcement may have reflected a misunderstanding of the
changing markets. See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 117, at 177 (“Beginning in the 1970s
and accelerating from the 1980s onward, antitrust authorities lost track of the ways in
which capital markets reconfigured themselves to maintain monopoly power.”).
137. See, e.g., Susanto Basu, Are Price-Cost Markups Rising in the United States? A
Discussion of the Evidence, J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2019, at 3; Berry et al., supra note
135; Loukas Karabarbounis & Brent Neiman, Accounting for Factorless Income, 33
NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 167 (2018); James Traina, Is Aggregate Market Power Increasing? Production Trends Using Financial Statements (Feb. 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3120849 [https://perma.cc/BAR5-HV2F].
138. See CHAD SYVERSON, BROOKINGS ECON. STUD., MACROECONOMICS AND MARKET
POWER: FACTS, POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS 4 (2019), https://www
.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ES_20190116_Syverson-Macro-Micro
-Market-Power.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8B8-ZEH3].
139. See Basu, supra note 137, at 19.
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monopoly power in the U.S. economy will continue.140 But clearly,
there are strong reasons to be concerned.
Turning from product to labor markets, the emerging evidence
reveals a significant increase in employers’ power over workers. Examining a near-universe of online job vacancies, José Azar and co-authors find that judging by the DOJ/FTC standards (that those agencies
use in product markets), 60% of U.S. labor markets are highly concentrated and another 11% are moderately concentrated.141 These
macro-effects are consistent with the evidence of anticompetitive labor market practices at the micro-level, ranging from non-poaching
agreements142 to non-compete clauses143 to expansive licensing requirements.144 Weak antitrust enforcement against labor market monopsony and legal obstacles to employees’ challenges of employer
market power have not helped.145 “A key worry . . . is that anticompetitive practices have often targeted the most vulnerable workers: those
with limited education and low skills.”146
Greater employer concentration corresponds to lower wages—a
relationship that is more pronounced at high levels of concentration
and that has increased over time.147 Moreover, in areas where labor
market concentration has increased, low earners have seen their
140. In fact, De Loecker and co-authors have already replied to the criticisms of
their work, pointing out that some of their critics rely on an unrealistic assumption and
an ill-fitting modeling framework. See De Loecker et al., supra note 123, at 603–05.
141. See José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall Steinbaum & Bledi Taska, Concentration in U.S. Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data, 66 LAB. ECON. 1, 1–2
(2020). These numbers tend to overstate the economic significance of market concentration somewhat because many highly concentrated markets are very small. See David Berger, Kyle F. Herkenhoff & Simon Mongey, Labor Market Power 9 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25719, 2019), https://www.nber.org/system/
files/working_papers/w25719/w25719.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FAZ-4X5X]. Still, the
numbers are striking.
142. See Naidu et al., supra note 123, at 571–72.
143. See ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LOW-INCOME WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 7–8 (2018), https://
www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_
monopsony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K7G-RK9X].
144. See infra text accompanying notes 271–74.
145. See Naidu et al., supra note 123, at 569–73.
146. Id. at 572.
147. See José Azar, Iona Marinescu & Marshall I. Steinbaum, Labor Market Concentration 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24147, 2017), https://
www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24147/w24147.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5VC3-M39W]; Efraim Benmelech, Nittai Bergman & Hyunseob Kim, Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24307, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/
files/working_papers/w24307/w24307.pdf [https://perma.cc/F46C-LHH5].
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wages decline while high earners have experienced little change in
their wages.148 These trends are even more troubling than they appear
because greater concentration also leads to employers demanding
higher skills, especially from their low-skill workers.149 So these workers’ skill-based wages should be higher, not lower, when concentration increases.
Suresh Naidu, Eric Posner, and Glen Weyl roughly estimate that
“monopsony power in the U.S. economy reduces overall output and
employment by 13%, and labor’s share of national output by 22%.”150
New, micro-level empirical work shows that “the degree of monopsony power is substantially larger in low-wage labor markets.”151 David Berger and colleagues disagree that labor market power has led to
the decline in the labor share, but show convincingly that this oligopsony power has imposed “substantial welfare losses . . . which range
from 3 to 8 percent of lifetime consumption.”152
As always, there are doubts. The decline of labor share in the national income may be due to trade liberalization.153 Labor markets
more exposed to the China Shock are also more concentrated,154 at
least in part because some domestic firms went out of business. It is
also possible that technological change gives rise to “superstar firms”
with higher productivity, and these firms capture an increasingly

148. See Kevin Rinz, Labor Market Concentration, Earnings Inequality, and Earning
Mobility 4–5 (Ctr. for Admin. Recs. Rsch. & Applications, Working Paper No. 2018-10,
2018), https://www.census.gov/library/working-papers/2018/adrm/carra-wp
-2018-10.html [https://perma.cc/UR9M-KQ4K].
149. See Brad Hershbein & Claudia Macaluso, Labor Market Concentration and the
Demand for Skills 5 (July 30, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://conference
.iza.org/conference_files/DATA_2018/macaluso_c26795.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ6C
-28ME].
150. Naidu et al., supra note 123, at 538.
151. Ihsaan Bassier, Arindrajit Dube & Suresh Naidu, Monopsony in Movers: The
Elasticity of Labor Supply to Firm Wage Policies 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 27755, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/
w27755/w27755.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCK3-RJR5].
152. Berger et al., supra note 141, at 1. The welfare loss arises due to lower wages,
less time spent working, and more work taking place at lower productivity firms. Id. at
37.
153. See Michael W.L. Elsby, Bart Hobjin & Aysegul Sahin, The Decline of the U.S.
Labor Share, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2013, at 1, https://www
.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2013b_elsby_labor_share.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8E35-HN72] (concluding that “offshoring of the labor-intensive
component of the U.S. supply chain [is] a leading potential explanation of the decline
in the U.S. labor share over the past 25 years”).
154. See Benmelech et al., supra note 147, at 5.
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greater market share.155 Some evidence supports this hypothesis, at
least for U.S. manufacturing.156 So maybe it is trade and technology after all, perhaps along with the U.S. competition policy and its (lax) enforcement, that explain the increase in market concentration.
Finally, recent research suggests that the current historically high
degree of common ownership of most publicly traded firms may be
harmful to economic competition. BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard,
and Fidelity together control more than a fifth of the value of the U.S.
stock market.157 The first three of these constitute the single largest
shareholder in eighty-eight percent of public companies in the
S&P500 index.158 And the consequences may be starting to show.
Airlines prices, for example, are arguably three to seven percent
higher due to anticompetitive power of institutional investors.159 Researchers observed similar effects in the banking industry.160 These
results are recent, and there are already strong counterarguments.161
Nonetheless, there is a real possibility that concentration in product
and labor (and maybe even capital) markets has harmed American
workers and consumers, especially those who live in the areas where
employers exert significant market power over wages.162
155. See David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson & John
Van Reenen, The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms, 135 Q.J. ECON.
645, 645 (2020).
156. See id. at 665–70.
157. See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 117, at 171.
158. See Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernado, Hidden Power
of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and
New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 322 (2017).
159. See José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1517 (2018).
160. See José Azar, Sahil Raina & Martin Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank
Competition 1, 3 (May 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2710252 [https://perma.cc/2CF9-B5KX].
161. See Patrick Dennis, Kristopher Gerardi & Carola Schenone, Common Ownership Does Not Have Anti-Competitive Effects in the Airline Industry (June 25, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3063465 [https://perma.cc/
SM4V-WB37] (finding no relationship between airline ticket prices and common ownership of airlines); Erik P. Gilje, Todd A. Gormley & Doron Levit, Who’s Paying Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives, 137 J. FIN.
ECON. 152, 154 (2020) (finding that accounting for possible investor inattention
“cast[s] doubt on the idea that overlapping ownership structures, particularly those
driven by asset manager mergers, significantly shift managers’ incentives or induce
anticompetitive behaviors among firms in the airline and banking industries” as suggested by Azar and co-authors); John D. Morley, Too Big To Be Activist, 92 S. CAL. L. REV.
1407, 1412–13 (2020) (explaining why exercise of market power is unlikely given the
institutional structure of the major institutional investors).
162. See, e.g., Azar et al., supra note 159; Azar et al., supra note 160.
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D. LABOR POLICY
Since at least the 1970s, membership in private sector labor unions has been declining while wage inequality has been increasing.163
Are the two changes related?
Over time, scholars have offered different answers. One side has
argued that the relationship between union membership and wage inequality is weak at best.164 The other side has asserted that “the decline in organized labor explains a fifth to a third of the growth in
[wage] inequality [between 1973 and 2007]—an effect comparable to
that of the growing stratification of wages by education.”165
The latest research relying on new data supports, and even magnifies, the latter view. A recent working paper overcomes a longstanding empirical challenge—absence of micro-level data on union
membership prior to 1973—and finds that “unions have had a significant, equalizing effect on the income distribution over” the period of
1936 to the present.166 Moreover, strong unions disproportionately
helped less-skilled workers, something that the weak unions of today
no longer do.167
The emerging evidence of labor market concentration further
highlights the importance of labor unions. Not only does greater market power of employers depress wages, but the negative correlation
between wages and market power is stronger when unionization
rates are low.168
163. See Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage
Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 513 (2011).
164. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion & Giovanni L. Violante, Deunionization, Technical Change and Inequality, in 55 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB.
POL’Y 229, 230 (2001) (“Most economists, however, discount the role of unions in the
increase in inequality.”).
165. Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 163, at 513, 517 (stating the conclusion and
comparing it with studies finding both weak and significant relationship).
166. Henry S. Farber, Daniel Herbst, Ilyana Kuziemko & Suresh Naidu, Unions and
Inequality over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data 1 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24587, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/
files/working_papers/w24587/w24587.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R5F-D6UK].
167. See id. at 3.
168. See Benmelech et al., supra note 147, at 4. The “it appears” qualifier in the text
is there because the link between the decline in labor share and unionization is uncertain. Compare Elsby, et al., supra note 153 (stating that “evidence for institutional explanations based on the decline in unionization is inconclusive” in explaining the decline in the labor share), with Autor et al., supra note 155, at 648 (noting that “the
broadly common experience of a decline in labor shares across countries with different
levels and evolutions of unionization and other labor market institutions somewhat
vitiates” the connection between “unions and the real value of the minimum wage”).
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There is also new evidence that government regulation weakening employment protections diminishes the bargaining power of
workers and reduces their wages.169 “Somewhat surprisingly,” the extensive analysis of the well-known decline in labor share “has touched
very little on the role of labor market regulation.”170 Yet it now appears quite likely that decades of U.S. (anti-)labor policies that contributed to the decline of labor unions harmed American workers, especially low-skill ones.171 And because today’s public sector unions
are the only ones yielding economic advantages for their members,172
the recent Supreme Court decision weakening these unions,173 as well
as public-sector unions’ loss of public support and political clout in
both parties,174 is bound to be particularly costly for a large group of
working Americans.
Drawing on many recent empirical findings discussed in this Part,
Anna Stansbury and Lawrence Summers make the broadest and the
boldest claim: the decline of “worker power”—and not globalization,
technological transformation, or the rise of monopoly or monopsony
power—is the best explanation for the “fall in the labor income share,
Yet new evidence suggests that deregulation of job protection laws in twenty-six countries did “contribute[] to some of the observed decline in labor shares in many advanced economics.” Gabriele Ciminelli, Romain Duval & Davide Furceri, Employment
Protection Deregulation and Labor Shares in Advanced Economies 5 (IMF Working Paper WP/18/186, 2018), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/08/
16/Employment-Protection-Deregulation-and-Labor-Shares-in-Advanced
-Economies-46074 [https://perma.cc/2VJB-9KFV].
169. See Ciminelli et al., supra note 167, at 7.
170. Id. at 8.
171. See Farber et al., supra note 166, at 3 (concluding that market “forces alone
cannot explain patterns in union membership over the 20th century”); TIMOTHY NOAH,
THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA’S GROWING INEQUALITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO
ABOUT IT 138–43 (2012) (describing the consequences of the Taft-Hartley Act passed
in 1947 and the later appointment of an anti-union head of NLRB by President
Reagan); Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 163, at 516 (same).
172. See David Card, Thomas Lemieux & W. Craig Riddell, Unions and Wage Inequality: The Roles of Gender, Skill and Public Sector Employment 28 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25313, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/
working_papers/w25313/w25313.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB24-G5MF] (finding that
private sector unions reduce male wage inequality by 1.7% and female wage inequality
by 0.6% while the respective numbers for public sector unions are 16.2% and 50%).
173. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)
(finding that mandatory collection of public union fees is unconstitutional).
174. See Dorian T. Warren, The Politics of Labor Policy Reform, in THE POLITICS OF
MAJOR POLICY REFORM IN POSTWAR AMERICA 103, 119 (Jeffery A. Jenkins & Sidney M.
Milkis eds., 2014) (describing the deteriorating public standing of public sector unions
and anti-union measures of both Republican and Democratic governors in the wake of
the Great Recession).
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an increase in [Tobin’s] Q, corporate profitability, and measured
markups, and a fall in the [non-accelerating rate of unemployment].”175 The magnitude of the decline is significant: the share of
product market rents captured by labor declined by half, “from 12%
of net value added in the nonfinancial corporate business sector in the
early 1980s to 6% in the 2010s.”176 And—should we be surprised?—
“the decline in labor rents was larger for non-college-educated workers than for college-educated workers.”177 What caused the loss of
worker power? Stansbury and Summers offer several reasons, but
changes in government labor market policies are first on their list.178
E. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
On the environmental front, decades-long extensive work on the
incidence of environmental taxes, subsidies, and tradable permits has
had little to say about the distributional effects of non-tax regulation.179 Yet regulation—and not taxes and tradeable permits—has
been Congress’s primary environmental policy tool.
Emerging research finds that regulatory mandates have significant distributional effects. Building energy codes, for example, disproportionately harm low-income homeowners.180 Corporate average
fuel economy (CAFE) standards are not only regressive but are more

175. Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27193, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/
files/working_papers/w27193/w27193.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU4W-KVHT]. By
“worker power” the authors mean power “arising from unionization or the threat of
union organizing, firms being run partly in the interests of workers as stakeholders,
and/or from efficiency wage effects.” Id. at 2.
176. Id. at 4.
177. Id. at 7.
178. See id. at 2 (listing “[f]irst, institutional changes: the policy environment has
become less supportive of worker power by reducing the incidence of unionism and
the credibility of the ‘threat effect’ of unionism or other organized labor” and the fall
of minimum wage in real terms).
179. A 2008 comprehensive review of environmental policy instruments devoted
just one or two sentences to the subject without citing any prior research. See Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W.H. Parry, Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy, 2 REV.
ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 152, 166 (2008); see also Don Fullerton & Erich Muehlegger, Who
Bears the Economic Burdens of Environmental Regulations?, 13 REV. ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y
62, 62 (2019) (making the same observation a decade later).
180. See Chris Bruegge, Tatyana Deryugina & Erica Myers, The Distributional Effects of Building Energy Codes, 6 J. ASS’N ENV’T & RES. ECONOMISTS S95, S99 (2019).
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regressive than carbon taxes would be.181 The same may be true of
other command-and-control regulation.182
Regulatory mandates may also lead to higher unemployment in
polluting industries and in areas where these industries are concentrated.183 While in basic economic models of environmental regulation “jobs are a cost, not a benefit,”184 there is clear evidence that the
basic models are too basic. They ignore the costs of changing jobs as
well as the relative job quality.185 Yet these costs are substantial, and
no work in environmental economics (or elsewhere) “attempts to
model the effect of regulation on job quality.”186 In fact, “there is a
sharp disconnect between the political importance of the jobs question and the limited research on the job effects of [environmental] policy.”187
If environmental regulation replaces “good jobs” in West Virginia
with “bad jobs” halfway across the country, the resulting distributional burdens or overall social welfare impacts are not known. The
latest models suggest that environmental mandates produce greater
labor market disruptions than environmental taxes or tradable permits do.188
Economic analysis of all these issues is just beginning. Given
widespread use of environmental mandates, the unintended distributional effects of U.S. environmental policies are yet another cause for
concern.
181. See Lucas W. Davis & Christopher R. Knittel, Are Fuel Economy Standards Regressive?, 6 J. ASS’N ENV’T & RES. ECONOMISTS S37, S38–39 (2019) (finding that CAFE
standards are regressive when their effects on costs of both new and used vehicles are
taken into account); Arik Levinson, Energy Efficiency Standards Are More Regressive
than Energy Taxes: Theory and Evidence, 6 J. ASS’N ENV’T & RES. ECONOMISTS S7, S9
(2019) (finding that CAFE standards are more regressive than a carbon tax when both
the type of vehicle and the miles driven are considered).
182. See Fullerton & Muehlegger, supra note 179, at 72 (reviewing “new and
emerging empirical literature on distributional effects of non-tax environmental mandates and regulations” and finding that “mandates are more regressive than a carbon
tax when compared in a revenue-neutral way”).
183. See Kenneth A. Castellanos & Garth Heutel, Unemployment, Labor Mobility, and
Climate Policy 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25797, 2019), https://
www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25797/w25797.pdf [https://perma
.cc/82CC-BY5H].
184. Marc A.C. Hafstead & Roberton C. Williams III, Jobs and Environmental Regulation, 1 ENV’T ENERGY POL’Y & ECON. 192, 198 (2020).
185. See id. at 204–06.
186. Id. at 205. The only exception the authors cite is a highly stylized model of the
effect of trade liberalization on a population of identical workers.
187. Id. at 192.
188. See Castellanos & Heutel, supra note 183, at 36–42.
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F. EFFICIENCY OF U.S. MARKETS
Until now, the discussion focused on the recent evidence of the
effects of various U.S. policies on American workers. We now turn
from policies to markets. It turns out that emerging evidence is changing economists’ long-settled views here as well.
Not long ago, economists believed that U.S. labor, product, and
capital markets are generally efficient. Trade economists, for instance,
assumed that the American labor force is highly mobile, that “U.S. markets are smoothly integrated across space,”189 reflecting their efficiency.190 This assumption was critical to the analysis of the distributional effects of trade liberalization. If workers move easily between
firms, industries, and regions,191 they will leave the industries and
places disadvantaged by growing foreign imports and move to industries and places that flourish due to growing U.S. exports. In fact, this
movement (“factor reallocation” in economic parlance) “is a crucial
part of the mechanism through which the aggregate gains from trade
are realized.”192
Yet despite the critical importance of the labor mobility assumption, “until recently, the literature had surprisingly little to say about
adjustment costs, as it was focused on steady state outcomes” when
all the switching has already occurred.193 When economists questioned the easy switching assumption in the past decade, they discovered that “there are substantial barriers to mobility and reallocation,”194 and that “[l]abor-market adjustment to trade shocks is
stunningly slow.”195 Even more disturbing is a growing evidence that
“less-skilled workers [are] less mobile and more sensitive to local
shocks.”196 The U.S. labor market turned out to be not that efficient
after all.
189. Autor et al., supra note 81, at 235.
190. “[G]eographical labor mobility is considered to be an efficient adjustment
mechanism to macroeconomic shocks.” Marco Caliendo, Steffen Künn & Robert
Mahlstedt, The Return to Labor Market Mobility: An Evaluation of Relocation Assistance
for the Unemployed, 148 J. PUB. ECON. 136, 137 (2017).
191. See Autor et al., supra note 81, at 207–08.
192. Goldberg, supra note 84, at xiv.
193. Id. at xx.
194. Id.
195. Autor et al., supra note 81, at 235. How slow? “[L]ocal labor force participation
rates remain . . . depressed and local unemployment rates remain . . . elevated for a full
decade or more after a shock commences.” Id.
196. Richard Hornbeck & Enrico Moretti, Who Benefits from Productivity Growth?
Direct and Indirect Effects of Local TFP Growth on Wages, Rents, and Inequality 3 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24661, 2019), https://www.nber.org/
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The economic analysis of competition reveals a similar shift in
economists’ views. Following a highly influential analysis by Arnold
Harberger published in 1954,197 economists assumed that market
power is not an economy-wide problem in U.S. product markets.198
Market power is indicative of monopolization—a textbook example of
market failure. Its absence is a sign that product markets are competitive and efficient.
Yet “[d]espite the vital importance of market power in economics, surprisingly little is known about its systematic patterns for the
aggregate economy and over time.”199 When economists recently considered how product markups changed over decades, they found evidence of a dramatic increase in market power.200
Or consider the well-known decline of the labor share since the
beginning of this century.201 As the share of national income going to
workers fell, economists suggested that technological change, mechanization, capital accumulation, change in the relative price of capital,
or unobserved intangible capital explained the decline.202 Each explanation concluded that the decline was efficient203 and even welfareenhancing in the long run.204 Notably, almost all explanations as-

system/files/working_papers/w24661/w24661.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAJ4C7PQ]. If
the shock is positive, lower mobility may help low-skill workers, as Hornbeck and
Moretti show. Id. at 37.
197. See Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV.
77 (1954).
198. See Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23687, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23687/w23687.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3UGW-KTR7] (“While there was a tradition to investigate the potential impact of market power on resource allocation, the analysis of Harberger (1954) concluded that profit rates across US (manufacturing) industries during the 1920s were
not sufficiently dispersed to generate any meaningful aggregate outcome. This analysis, and its conclusion that market power barely impacts economy-wide outcomes, became the default view held by many economists and policy makers ever since.”); Naidu
et al., supra note 123, at 541–42.
199. De Loecker et al., supra note 123, at 562.
200. See id.
201. See GIANDREA & SPRAGUE, supra note 125, at 1, 2, 5 (citing studies considering
the causes of the decline); see also Autor et al., supra note 125, at 180 (“[T]here is consensus that there has been a decline in the US labor share since the 1980s, particularly
in the 2000s.”); De Loecker et al., supra note 123, at 609 (“[T]he decline in the labor
share is widely discussed . . . .”).
202. See Barkai, supra note 128, at 2421, 2423.
203. See id. at 2422.
204. See id. at 2455–56.
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sumed that the decline in labor share necessarily meant that the capital share increased.205 This assumption came from empirical findings
that between the 1960s and 1980s, the share of economic rents (windfall profits) in the U.S. economy was close to zero, as it should be if an
economy is competitive.206
Even though we are now half a century removed from those decades, the zero-profit assumption has persisted until Simcha Barkai
abandoned it in his recent path-breaking work.207 His stark conclusion? Not only did the normal return to capital not increase to offset
the decrease in the labor share, but the capital share declined even
more than the labor share did.208 What increased—dramatically—
were windfall profits.209 The cause, again, is the decline in market
competition.210 That this rise improves efficiency and welfare is very
much in doubt, given that it causes large declines in output, wages, and
investment.211
One sees more of the same in other areas of economics. In the
1970s, 80s, and 90s, labor markets were viewed as reasonably competitive.212 Labor economists believed that unions were responsible
for the remaining labor market rigidity and inefficiency.213 To the extent that economists tested the employers’ monopsony power as an
alternative explanation, the tests were indirect and their persuasiveness was limited.214

205. See id. at 2454.
206. See id. at 2457–58.
207. See id. at 2459 (“To the best of my knowledge no [aggregate measure of pure
profits] exists for the past three decades.”).
208. See id. at 2460.
209. See id. at 2423.
210. See id. at 2424.
211. See id. at 2457.
212. See Naidu et al., supra note 123, at 541–42, 552–53 (noting that “economists
assumed that labor markets are reasonably competitive, and accordingly that labor
market power was not an important social problem”).
213. See Acemoglu et al., supra note 164, at 232 (“The standard view is one in
which unions are pure rent-seeking organizations. They distort the socially optimal
allocation of resources and represent an impediment to free contracting in the labor
market.”); Farber et al., supra note 166, at 5.
214. See Benmelech et al., supra note 147, at 5–6 (explaining that David Card and
Alan Krueger inferred monopsony power as a possible explanation of employers’ nonresponsiveness to an increase in minimum wage, and Michael Reich and co-authors
made the same inference from the workers’ relatively low propensity to leave jobs after wage declines).
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Then unions faltered but inefficiencies remained, surprising labor economists.215 “The concurrent decline of unions and rise of labor
market concentration implies that the neoliberal assumption that unions, rather than employers, are the major source of cartelization of
labor markets was false.”216
Naturally, economists have a lot of catching up to do.
The idea that even highly advanced labor markets, like that of the United
States, might be better characterized as imperfectly competitive opens a host
of questions about the welfare implications of industrial policies and labor
market institutions . . . . Empirical work lags particularly far behind the theory
in this domain.217

Next consider the economic analysis of environmental regulation.
Until recently, most computable general equilibrium models used to
estimate the effects of environmental regulation assumed full employment and perfect labor mobility across industries and regions.218 Yet
evidence suggests that neither assumption is warranted. The 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments, for instance, likely “induced substantial
mobility costs for affected workers.”219 High mobility costs undermine
labor market efficiency.
Macro economists, for their part, were optimistic about the U.S.
financial system. “At the onset of the [2008] crisis, the workhorse macroeconomic models assumed frictionless financial markets.”220 Then
the crisis hit, and the prevailing models of “frictionless, perfectly competitive, complete information”221 markets were of little use to the
Federal Reserve and other government agencies trying to contain a
meltdown of the imperfect, real-world financial system. The same
models looked detached from reality when it turned out that the most
important benchmark in the deepest financial market turned out to
215. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 143, at 4 (referring to monopsonization as
“a new and perhaps surprising” explanation for wage stagnation and income inequality).
216. Benmelech et al., supra note 147, at 4.
217. David Card, Ana Rute Cardoso, Joerg Heining & Patrick Kline, Firms and Labor
Market Inequality: Evidence and Some Theory, 36 J. LAB. ECON. S1, S57 (2018) (emphasis
added).
218. See Castellanos & Heutel, supra note 183, at 2; Hafstead & Williams, supra note
184, at 195.
219. Castellanos & Heutel, supra note 183, at 3 n.1; W. Reed Walker, The Transitional Costs of Sectoral Reallocation: Evidence from the Clean Air Act and the Workforce,
128 Q.J. ECON. 1787, 1797 (2013).
220. Mark Gertler & Simon Gilchrist, What Happened: Financial Factors in the Great
Recession, J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2018, at 3, 3.
221. John C. Williams, The Rediscovery of Financial Market Imperfections, in TOWARD A JUST SOCIETY: JOSEPH STIGLITZ AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMICS, supra note
126, at 201, 201.
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have been manipulated for years, and it was not the only example of
major financial market manipulation.222 Understandably, macro economists have now moved away from the naïvely optimistic pre-crisis
assumptions and beliefs.223
Emerging from all these observations is an unmistakable trend.
For decades, trade economists, industrial organization economists, labor economists, macro economists, and environmental economists relied on rather Panglossian assumptions about the efficiency of the U.S.
economy. Some of these assumptions were probably wrong all
along.224 Some were valid when made decades ago but remained in
use well past their expiration date.225 Either way, economists increasingly recognize that these assumptions were flawed, and so were the
conclusions based on these assumptions. Proceeding on parallel
tracks, law and economics scholars have become increasingly skeptical about the claims that the common law either is efficient or is developing toward efficiency.226
***
The findings summarized in this Part reveal a sobering picture.
Not only did many government policies likely give rise to large, unintended economic losses, but these losses fell on the same group of
Americans—low-skill, low-education, pre-retirement age workers.
Their obvious economic vulnerability makes the recent findings especially troubling. Moreover, market failures and other inefficiencies
that have been growing in various sectors of the U.S. economy diminished American workers’ capacity to avoid or absorb their losses. The
next question is what, if anything, did the U.S. government do in response.
222. That rate is LIBOR. See Alan B. Krueger, Princeton Univ. & NBER, Luncheon
Address at the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium: Reflections on Dwindling Worker
Bargaining Power and Monetary Policy 1 (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.kansascityfed
.org/~/media/files/publicat/sympos/2018/papersandhandouts/824180824
kruegerremarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU2S-S5RN] (remarking that “some of the
best finance economists in the world thought it inconceivable that foreign exchange
markets or LIBOR could be manipulated”). Both markets were proven to be rigged. Id.
223. See Gertler & Gilchrist, supra note 220, at 4–9.
224. Assumptions about low switching costs in the economic analysis of trade and
about unions as the main cause of labor market rigidity come to mind.
225. An example is the assumption about low windfall profits.
226. See Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the
Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 911 (2003); Anthony Niblett, Richard
A. Posner & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of a Legal Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 330
(2010); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success
or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003); D. Daniel Sokol, Rethinking the Efficiency of
the Common Law, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 797 (2019).
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III. GOVERNMENT’S DISTRIBUTIONAL (NON)ADJUSTMENTS
Congress and the President have the power to create distributional burdens, and the power to mitigate them as well. Part II revealed that a wide range of national policies likely created unintended
burdens. This Part shows that the U.S. government did little to mitigate them. Its main targeted relief program has been limited and ineffective. Its general efforts to address the impacts discussed in Part II
have been inadequate. To make things worse, the U.S. government’s
growing reliance on states in administering federal social insurance
programs—as well as the U.S. government’s reluctance to counter
some state-specific policies—exacerbated the losses resulting from
the national policies discussed in Part II. These conclusions matter
greatly in assessing the two distributional arguments at the center of
this Article.
A. TARGETED ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
The only significant federal program specifically aimed to counter the unintended distributional impacts of a major U.S. policy is the
Trade Adjustment Assistance program (TAA). The TAA offers cash
benefits, retraining, and relocation assistance to workers who lost
their jobs to import competition.227 The idea for the program came
from David J. McDonald in 1953. McDonald was the president of the
United Steelworkers union and a member of the presidential Commission on Foreign Economic Policy.228 He supported free trade and
viewed adjustment assistance as a response to the possible (though at
that point entirely hypothetical) dislocations resulting from trade liberalization.229 Championed by John F. Kennedy since his days as a junior senator from Massachusetts, the TAA began operation in 1962.230
In the first six years of the TAA’s existence, the Tariff Commission
tasked with evaluating petitions for adjustment assistance denied
every single one.231 Assistance started flowing after that, but barely.232
Only forty-six thousand workers received benefits between 1968 and
1973.233 Congress significantly expanded the program in 1973 with
227. See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 107. See generally Baicker & Rehavi, supra note 68,
at 239–46 (describing the overall evolution of TAA). TAA was also designed to help U.S.
companies affected by foreign competition. See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 111.
228. See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 116.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 111.
231. See id. at 118.
232. See id.
233. See id.
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support from the Nixon administration.234 As a result, more than 1.3
million workers qualified for TAA benefits between 1975 and 1981.235
Then the Reagan administration cut the program’s funding by seventy-five percent.236 It became almost impossible to qualify for benefits,237 and only sixteen thousand workers received them in 1981.238
Participation grew gradually but remained fairly low until 2002, when
the George W. Bush administration reached a deal about its fast-track
trade-negotiating authority with Congress.239 The final expansion
came as part of President Obama’s stimulus package in 2009.240 So
just in the past two decades, participation in the TAA went from under
100,000 in 2000, to 235,000 in 2002,241 to 450,000 between 2009 and
2011.242 The 2009 expansion was temporary, however.243 By 2017,
only 94,000 workers benefited from the program.244
These wild fluctuations are not a sign of a stable, reliable program.245 And given that millions likely lost jobs from the China Shock
alone,246 the current level of participation reveals the program’s overwhelming inadequacy. This inadequacy is obvious when one looks at
the TAA’s significance in the lives of affected workers. In the regions
most harmed by the China Shock, for example, TAA payments are
“negligible relative to many other transfer programs”247 that are not
targeted to provide specific relief. For a program designed to assist,
the TAA does not offer much assistance. No other major federal program aims at relieving the unintended distributional costs of government policies adopted in the past half-century.
B. GENERAL SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAMS
If the targeted congressional efforts are meager and ineffective,
what about the general redistributive programs? The Earned Income
234. See id. at 119–20.
235. See id. at 120.
236. See id. at 121.
237. The grant rate dropped from over 80% to just 14%. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 121–22.
240. See id. at 122.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 9.
244. See id.
245. Some of these fluctuations, such as the 2009 expansion, reflect economic cycles, but many do not.
246. See Acemoglu et al., supra note 99.
247. Autor et al., supra note 81, at 231.
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Tax Credit, or EITC, is a major cash transfer program for working
Americans. Enacted in 1975 and expanded on several occasions, most
recently in 2015,248 it is one of the federal government’s largest antipoverty programs. In 2017, it provided about $65 billion to twentyseven million workers.249 Notably, Congress significantly expanded
the EITC in 1993, just as the country was entering into NAFTA and
gearing up for negotiations that culminated in China’s entry into the
WTO.250
The EITC surely helps low-income American workers. But its design undermines the claim that it was intended to—or did—serve as
an effective distributional adjustment to the government-created economic shocks discussed earlier.
For the lowest earners, the EITC increases as wages rise.251 So if
trade liberalization, or labor market monopsony, or environmental
regulation reduced wages of some workers, their EITC payments went
down as well. For those earning a bit more, the EITC is a fixed dollar
amount that would not counteract a decrease in wages.252 Moreover,
the EITC is available in meaningful amounts only to parents caring for
children (and some other dependents).253 Neither young single workers,254 nor older workers with children over nineteen,255 nor workers
living separately from their children256 are eligible for benefits. Given

248. See MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44825, THE EARNED INTAX CREDIT (EITC): A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1, 6 (2018), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R44825.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2AH-6WZA].
249. Statistics for 2017 Tax Returns with EITC, IRS, https://www.eitc.irs.gov/eitc
-central/statistics-for-tax-returns-with-eitc/statistics-for-2017-tax-returns-with-eitc
[https://perma.cc/WGX9-ZU9F] (Dec. 22, 2020).
250. See CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 248, at 6.
251. See ELAINE MAAG, URB. INST., WHO BENEFITS FROM EXPANDING THE EITC OR CTC?
(2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98829/who-benefits
-from-expanding-the-eitc-or-ctc_understanding-the-intersection-of-the-eitc_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TX2P-43MV]. The proportionate relationship between wages and
ETIC exists up to earned income of $14,290 for a family with two children. See Rev.
Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 395.
252. The EITC amount remains flat for earned income between $14,290 and
$24,350 for a family with two children. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 3.05.
253. See id. (stating that the maximum credit with no children is $519 compared
to $3,461 for one-child households, $5,716 for two-child households, and $6,431 for
households with three or more children).
254. See IRS PUB. 596, EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC) 16 (2021), https://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F3P-TA85].
255. See id. at 9.
256. See id. at 11.
COME
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the breakdown of marriage among low-income Americans,257 the last
limitation in particular severely limits the reach of the EITC.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)258 is another federal program that had the potential of relieving some of the
economic hardship of low-wage stagnation and low-skill job losses.
But a crucial part of the ACA—the national Medicaid expansion—was
struck down by the Supreme Court.259 Twelve states have not expanded Medicaid as of November 2020,260 including some of the states
most affected by the policies discussed in Part II.261
Other than the EITC, the curtailed ACA, and the ill-fated TAA,
there has been no significant government program that can be plausibly viewed as countering the losses discussed earlier. General antipoverty programs like unemployment insurance, disability insurance,
and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families are surely used by
workers affected by free trade, labor market monopsony, and so on.262
But a claim that any of these programs was adopted in order to mitigate the adverse distributional effects discussed here is implausible.
In fact, changes to some of these programs have made things worse,
as the next Section explains.
There are several specific employment and training programs
that are plausibly viewed as assisting low-skill workers regardless of
the cause of their job losses. These programs are numerous, and almost all are poorly funded and negligible in effects.263 Many of them
do not aim to help dislocated workers.264 The largest among those that
257. See Anne L. Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and
Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 720–21 (2013) (explaining the link between lasting marriages and higher income and education levels).
258. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
259. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (finding
that the ACA’s national expansion of Medicaid exceeded Congress’s constitutional
powers).
260. See Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state
-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map [https://perma.cc/ZB78-F3W6].
261. For example, the Carolinas are among the states most affected by the China
Shock, see Autor et al., supra note 81, at 224–25, and Kansas and large parts of Texas
are among areas with the highest employer concentration and market power, see Azar
et al., supra note 141, at 25. None of these states expanded Medicaid. See Status of State
Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, supra note 260.
262. See Autor et al., supra note 81, at 230.
263. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-92, MULTIPLE EMPLOYMENT AND
TRAINING PROGRAMS: PROVIDING INFORMATION ON COLOCATING SERVICES AND CONSOLIDATING
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES COULD PROMOTE EFFICIENCIES 11, 50–52 (2011).
264. Some programs are focused on youth, on re-integration of ex-offenders, on
disabled veterans, and so on. Id. at 47–49.
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do is the Workforce Investment Act / Dislocated Workers program enacted in 1998.265 In 2009, Congress spent slightly less than $2.5 billion
on this program.266 TAA disbursed about $700 million; the National
Farmworker Jobs Program $80 million.267 Compared to $65 billion of
EITC benefits, these are trivial amounts. The distressing bottom line is
that although politicians have been talking about the unintended burdens of free trade, regulation, and technological change for decades,
they did little to address these burdens.
C. MAKING THINGS WORSE
The federal structure of the U.S. political system, combined with
the federal government’s increasing reliance on states in administering national safety net programs, has made things even worse for lowincome Americans. As Part II explains, many unintended distributional losses have been geographically concentrated. Some areas have
been affected by trade liberalization much more than others. The
country’s heartland has highly concentrated labor markets, while the
coasts do not.268 Given this concentration, geographic mobility is crucial for a fast dissipation of labor market shocks.
Yet a number of state policies have likely reduced geographic mobility of low-skill workers over the past several decades. Restrictive
zoning laws adopted in many economically thriving locales artificially
increased housing costs.269 Because these costs consume a larger
share of one’s budget as income declines, pricey real estate disproportionately affected relocation opportunities of low-income Americans.270
Another barrier has been the proliferation of state-imposed occupational licensing and related requirements. Over the past six decades, the share of the U.S. labor force subject to these requirements
265. See Burt S. Barnow & Jeffrey Smith, Employment and Training Programs, in 2
ECONOMICS OF MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 127, 132–33,
139 (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2016).
266. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 263, at 47.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Azar et al., supra note 141, at figs.1 & 2.
269. See Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in
the U.S. Declined?, 102 J. URB. ECON. 76, 76 (2017) (explaining the link between land use
regulations and housing supply elasticity); David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 114–15 (2017) (discussing the dramatic shift to stricter land-use regulation in the 1970s and 1980s and its impact on
housing prices); Furman & Orszag, supra note 127, at 29 (discussing land-use restrictions and other factors contributing to rising housing costs).
270. See Ganong & Shoag, supra note 269, at 78.

2021]

DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS

1629

grew five-fold.271 No longer limited to doctors and lawyers, licensing
regimes cover barbers, florists, manicurists, and many other relatively
low-skill professions.272 It is estimated that more than 1,100 occupations are regulated in at least one state.273
Because these licensing restrictions are state-specific, they have
a negative effect on labor mobility.274 Moreover, according to the firstof-a-kind recent estimate of the welfare effects of licensing, licensing
an occupation “reduces total surplus from the occupation, defined as
the welfare value of trade in its labor services, by about 12 percent
relative to no licensing. Workers and consumers respectively bear
about 70 and 30 percent of these welfare costs.”275 Workers with only
a high school degree are among those most negatively affected.276
The federal government has done very little to counter these
state-imposed restrictions. So, the state-erected barriers to geographic mobility of low-skill workers have grown unabated.
The federal government’s contribution to geographic immobility
goes beyond mere passivity, however. From welfare to food stamps,277
from Medicaid to unemployment insurance, the federal government
runs its low-income assistance programs through states.278 The 1996

271. See Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. Chung, How Much of Barrier to Entry Is Occupational Licensing? 57 BRIT. J. INDUS. RELS. 919, 919 (2019) (describing an increase from
5% to 25%).
272. See OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS &
DEP’T OF LAB., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 6, 25 (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_
final_nonembargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNU3-VLKB].
273. Id. at 4.
274. See Blair & Chung, supra note 271, at 920 (finding that “licensing reduces labor supply by an average of 17–27 per cent”); Janna E. Johnson & Morris M. Kleiner, Is
Occupational Licensing a Barrier to Interstate Migration?, 12 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y
347, 350, 366–69 (2020) (finding that in general, state licensing has a negative but
small effect on interstate mobility, but also discovering that for some occupations such
as pest control workers and pharmacists the effects are sizeable); Schleicher, supra
note 269, at 120–21 (summarizing various studies on the issue).
275. Morris M. Kleiner & Evan J. Soltas, A Welfare Analysis of Occupational Licensing
in the U.S. States 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26383, 2019),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w26383 [https://perma.cc/5QZS-MCWV].
276. Id. at 3.
277. “Welfare” is the non-technical name for the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families and “food stamps” is the non-technical name for the Supplemental Nutritional
Assistance Program. See, e.g., FALK, supra note 30, at 1, 5.
278. See Schleicher, supra note 269, at 125–26; see also supra text accompanying
notes 30–33. The EITC is a major exception—it is administered directly by the federal
government. See CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 248, at 5.

1630

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1583

welfare reform increased federal-to-state delegation, exacerbating interstate differences in benefits, eligibility, and conditions of low-income support programs.279 Variation in unemployment benefits—the
form of assistance of most immediate concern for displaced workers—is nothing short of staggering. Minimum earnings requirements
for eligibility, for instance, range from $130 in Hawaii to $3,400 in
Florida.280 The maximum weekly benefit is $646 in Massachusetts but
only $190 in Mississippi.281 None of these and related variations are
transparent. Complexity and heterogeneity of benefits inevitably limit
interstate mobility by giving rise to uncertainty, hassle, and fear of losing some of the benefits.282 It is far from clear that the federal government took these mobility costs into account in its decisions to increasingly delegate the administration of the federal social safety net
programs to the states.283
***
Over the past several decades, the federal government has put in
place a number of significant social programs. It enacted the ACA.284 It
greatly expanded the EITC.285 It added prescription drug coverage to

279. See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 175, 183 (1999) (describing the variations of 1996 AFDC

benefit plans across states); Ryan Nunn, Jana Parsons & Jay Shambaugh, How Difficult
Is It To Find a Job?, BROOKINGS INST.: UP FRONT (May 2, 2019), https://www
.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/05/02/how-difficult-is-it-to-find-a-job [https://
perma.cc/5R3A-78CA] (reporting that duration of unemployment benefits varies from
twelve weeks to twenty-eight weeks depending on the state); Lars J. Lefgren, Jaren C.
Pope & David P. Sims, Contemporary State Policies and Intergenerational Income Mobility 10, 50 tbl.6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25896, 2019), https://
www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25896/w25896.pdf [https://perma
.cc/NJ8D-7P3C] (describing large inter-state differences in the generosity of state social safety net programs).
280. Krueger & Meyer, supra note 26, at 2334.
281. Id. at 2335.
282. Schleicher, supra note 269, at 126–27. This heterogeneity, combined with
state-specific licensing and restrictive zoning may well explain why inter-state mobility has been lower than inter-county mobility for the past several decades, although
other explanations of the same phenomenon exist. See Furman & Orszag, supra note
127, at 39–43 (exploring possible explanations for decreases in labor market fluidity).
283. As David Schleicher points out, federal tax subsidies for owner-occupied
housing may also reduce geographic mobility of low-income homeowners. Schleicher,
supra note 269, at 127–30.
284. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
285. See CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 248, at 6–7 (describing the 1993 expansion).
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Medicare.286 But none of these programs targeted—or especially benefitted—low-skill American workers, disproportionately disadvantaged by U.S. trade, immigration, competition, and labor policies. The
program enacted to help some of these workers—the TAA—has been
singularly unsuccessful. To make things worse, Congress’s increasing
delegation of social safety net programs to the states made it harder
for low-skill workers to move across state lines to areas of greater economic opportunity. The federal government’s failure to intervene as
states and local jurisdictions erected additional barriers to workers’
movement further exacerbated the problem. Overall, then, U.S. distributional policies did little to alleviate the unintended burdens of government decisions considered in Part II. Quite likely, some federal (as
well as state and local) policies added to these burdens instead.
IV. DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS, IN REVERSE
Having reached this point in the discussion, it is easy to compare
the policy takeaways from the two arguments described in Part I with
the actual policies discussed in Parts II and III. The comparison reveals
that the academic arguments and the actual policies have an uncanny
resemblance. Legal rules were indeed designed without regard to
their distributional effects, just as the efficiency-only argument would
recommend. Congress indeed ignored transitional losses, just as the
no-compensation argument would advise.287
This comparison certainly does not amount to a claim that the academic arguments caused the actual policies. The U.S. economy and
the country’s political system are too complex to allow for any such
causal inference. But the two arguments are important even if they
merely influenced academic and policy debates. And there is plenty of
reasons to think that they did.288 Whether such influence is merited
going forward depends on the plausibility of the arguments’ underlying assumptions—the question to which we now turn.

286. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2071–76 (offering optional prescription drug coverage for Medicare enrollees).
287. I am not the first one to note stark similarities between major U.S. policies
enacted by administrations and congressional majorities of both political parties over
the past four decades and the arguments’ prescriptions. See, e.g., Memorandum from
Larry Kramer, President, William & Flora Hewlett Found., to the William & Flora
Hewlett Found. Bd. of Dirs. (Apr. 26, 2018), https://hewlett.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/04/Beyond-Neoliberalism-Public-Board-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDR2
-VD7Y].
288. See sources cited supra notes 18, 74.
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A. THE EFFICIENCY-ONLY ARGUMENT
1. The Tax-and-Transfer Adjustment Assumption
The first assumption underlying the efficiency-only argument is
that appropriate distributional adjustments are made through the taxand-transfer system. In the absence of unintended distributional
shifts, “appropriate” simply means viewed as desirable by policymakers at the time. If, however, unintended distributional burdens do
arise, and if policymakers do not view these burdens as desirable, “appropriate” adjustments are those that offset such unintended burdens.289
The discussion in the previous two Parts demonstrates that it is
very likely that large burdens did arise. It is also clear that these burdens were not intended. This conclusion follows not from a magical
insight into someone’s state of mind.290 Rather, the burdens were unintended because they were unexpected.
Until the recent wave of empirical research, policymakers had no
rigorous evidence of the magnitude of the losses described in Part II,
and little knowledge of some of those losses. This is not to say that
there were no warnings. Debates about the costs of trade liberalization started shortly after the end of World War II,291 even though the
United States was close to an autarchy at the time.292 Congress’s concerns about distributional effects of market concentration go all the
way back to the beginning of the twentieth century.293 Protectionist

289. This is exactly what Shavell explained in the passage quoted supra note 42.
290. Arguments about the futility of discovering the intent of individual policymakers and entire legislative bodies are well known. See, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler, Who
Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 986–95 (2017); Victoria F. Nourse,
A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE
L.J. 70, 76 (2012); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 777 & n.7 (1999).
291. See Wilcox, supra note 16, at 884–89 (marshalling arguments against the view
of Secretary of State Dean Acheson that “producers who may suffer from increased
imports, caused by further reductions in the American tariff, might be compensated in
some way by the government”).
292. See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 1–2 (quoting Wikipedia, which defines “autarky”
as existing “whenever an entity can survive or continue its activities without external
assistance or international trade”).
293. See Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 278–79 (2017)
(discussing congressional views on antitrust between 1890 and 1914).
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restrictions on immigrants’ employment are at least a century old as
well.294
But speculation and fears should not be confused with evidence.
After all, the CBO reassured Congress in 1993 that losses from NAFTA
would be “surprisingly small.”295 At about the same time, the National
Research Council issued a report on economic and fiscal consequences
of immigration.296 The report concluded that “there is only a small adverse impact of immigration on the wage and employment opportunities of competing native groups.”297 These conclusions gave policymakers little cause for concern. Two decades later it turned out that
these conclusions were overly optimistic.
If one agrees that the losses from major policies discussed here
were unintended, can one question whether these losses were objectionable? After all, there is no such thing as the ideal distribution of
income (or wealth, or opportunities) in the economy—ideals are in
the eye of the beholder. So, there is no way to know if any change in
distribution is desirable from some ideal point of view. Not knowing
the baseline, how can one evaluate a change?
Whether this logic persuades one in general, it has little purchase
when it comes to the evidence presented here. Geographic and industry variations are the reason. The China Shock hit North Carolina but
not Nevada.298 U.S. labor markets became concentrated in the heartland but not on the coasts.299 There is no plausible argument that prior
to the China Shock low-skill workers in North Carolina were unjustifiably better off than low-skill workers in Nevada, that before labor
markets became concentrated high school dropouts were doing better
in Nebraska than in California. Yet only if these disparities indeed existed can one suggest that the China Shock or the labor market monopsony have led to desirable distributional outcomes by hurting
North Carolinian and Nebraskan workers who had somehow benefitted from an earlier unjustifiable advantage. The argument fails on its
face.

294. See KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW IN
AMERICA, 1600–2000, at 161–62 (2015) (discussing California’s 1913 Alien Land Act
and a similar Washington law passed in 1921).
295. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 10.
296. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997).
297. Id. at 236.
298. See Autor et al., supra note 81, at 225.
299. See Azar et al., supra note 141, at fig.1.
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The bottom line, then, is that the large losses described in Part II
were both unintended and undesirable. Given this conclusion, the major policy failure of the past several decades has not been choosing the
wrong policy instrument for distributional adjustments—it has been
not making sufficient adjustments of any kind. Congress simply failed
to offset distributional burdens through the legal system or the tax
system. The tax-and-transfer adjustment assumption failed.
This Article is not the first one to raise doubts about the realism
of that assumption. Ronen Avraham, David Fortus, and Kyle Logue
pointed out that policymakers aiming to implement tax-and-transfer
adjustments contemplated by the efficiency-only argument “would
face an enormous informational burden” making such adjustments
“virtually impossible to implement.”300 Avraham and co-authors offer
many reasons supporting their conclusion, all conceptual.301 Lee Fennell and Richard McAdams offered a related critique. For the efficiency-only argument to be plausible as a guide to real-world policymaking (what they call prescriptive tax superiority), it must be true
either that appropriate adjustments actually happen through the taxand-transfer system, or—if they do not—that they are equally unlikely to happen through the legal system.302 Fennell and McAdams offered many reasons—again, conceptual—why such “invariance” is
highly unlikely.303 Richard Revesz pointed out that given increasing
congressional gridlock, the likelihood of “[c]ontinual redistributive
tax reforms” implementing the adjustments assumed by the efficiency-only argument is negligible.304
There is also some empirical evidence contradicting the tax-andtransfer adjustment assumption. Zachary Liscow studied school funding reform in Connecticut and concluded that distributional effects of
court desegregation orders were not offset by changes in that state’s
income tax.305
Fennell and McAdams come closest to articulating this Article’s
critique of the tax-and-transfer adjustment assumption. They argue

300. Avraham et al., supra note 74, at 1130.
301. See id. at 1144–48.
302. Fennell & McAdams, supra note 18, at 1058.
303. These reasons include political inertia, interest group politics, framing, and
more. See id. at 1056.
304. Revesz, supra note 18, at 1520–24.
305. Liscow, supra note 37, at 36–37.
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that there is no “evidence that Congress is consistently offsetting redistributive legal rules in the real world.”306 To support this conclusion they observe that the “tax-and-transfer system has not generally
adjusted over time to correct for changes in the national income distribution.”307 The U.S. Gini coefficient, they point out, rose by twentythree percent between 1974 and 2012, revealing a large increase in
income inequality.308 It is likely that some of this increase is due to
changes in legal rules rather than other reasons, they argue.309 If so,
these (unspecified) legal changes created economic burdens that the
tax system ignored.
The efficiency-only argument’s proponents defend the tax-andtransfer adjustment assumption. As for narrowly targeted adjustments of the kind that Liscow finds lacking, their absence is hardly
surprising, they remark.
It remains true that the legislature is not in the business of fine-tuning the
tax system each time a program is enacted or repealed. . . . [O]ne would not
expect tax adjustments to offset the [distributive effects of legal rules] completely and precisely. Nevertheless, if one had to guess, it seems plausible
that roughly, on average, and over time, changes in [legal rules] will tend to
be accompanied by tax adjustments that offset changes in the distributive incidence of . . . those [rules].310

As for congressional gridlock and, more generally, claims that
“the tax system does not, or is unlikely to, change to address distributive concerns,” Weisbach argues that these claims are “flat out contradicted by the facts.”311 Congress tinkers with the tax code incessantly,
“most often with great focus on distributional issues,” he explains.312
Even if only a modest portion of these changes were distributive in nature . . . the
number of [tax-and-transfer] adjustments would be high. Blanket assertions that
the tax system does not respond to distributional concerns are false.313

There is also some evidence suggesting that distributional adjustments do take place sometimes.314
306. Fennell & McAdams, supra note 18, at 1081.
307. Id. at 1079.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1079–82.
310. Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost
of Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 513, 521 (1996). For other statements in the same vein, see
Fennell & McAdams, supra note 18, at 1076–77.
311. David A. Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis: Welfare
Economics Meets Organizational Design, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151, 174 (2015).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See Richard T. Boylan & Naci Mocan, Intended and Unintended Consequences
of Prison Reform, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 558, 558 (2014) (concluding that when following
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This is the state of play in the academic debate about the practical
implications of the efficiency-only argument and the realism of the
tax-and-transfer adjustment assumption. Opponents raise theoretical
objections, identify specific instances where the assumption proved to
be false, and point to practical realities—congressional gridlock, rise
of income inequality—that indirectly suggest that the assumption is
implausible. Proponents counter with theoretical points of their own
and make equally indirect empirical observations. At the end of the
day, even the opponents conclude that “[e]mpirically, little is known
about whether the distributional impacts of various institutions’ policy choices stick.”315
This Article, as must be clear by now, reaches a very different conclusion. A lot—not a little—is known about the stickiness of distributional impacts. The Article’s emphasis is on rigorous, wide-ranging
empirical evidence of specific, major distributional burdens, and on
congressional failure to implement any significant program that may
be plausibly viewed as the kind of adjustment that the efficiency-only
argument assumes.316 The failure of the tax-and-transfer adjustment
assumption, the Article shows, is both more definitive and much more
dramatic than previously recognized. Over the past several decades,
the U.S. tax-and-transfer system has ignored unintended losses running in the multiple billions of dollars and millions of jobs.317 So, it may
or may not be true in theory that legal rules should ignore distribution
because “there is a better method of addressing these concerns.”318
But in practice, that better method has not been deployed for decades.
This conclusion alone is sufficient to set aside the efficiency-only argument as a source of real-world policy guidance, at least until U.S.
court orders requiring states to reduce prison overcrowding, “correctional expenditures increase and welfare cash expenditures decrease . . ., suggesting that the burden
of improved prison conditions is borne by welfare recipients”).
315. Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1666 (2018).
316. A working paper by James Sallee bolsters this conclusion. He shows that even
for a relatively simple legal rule—a Pigouvian tax on gasoline—“it is infeasible to create a Pareto improvement from the taxation of . . . goods [subject to the Pigouvian tax],
and moreover . . . plausible policies are likely to leave a large fraction of households as
net losers.” James M. Sallee, Pigou Creates Losers: On the Implausibility of Achieving Pareto Improvements from Efficiency-Enhancing Policies 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 25831, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25831 [https://
perma.cc/BB3T-27AX]. Sallee’s analysis offers both theoretical and econometric support for the arguments about the severity of policymakers’ informational constraints
that were advanced conceptually by Avraham and co-authors. See Avraham et al., supra
note 74, at 1129–31.
317. See supra Part II.
318. Weisbach, supra note 14, at 439.
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policymakers begin to make timely and adequate tax-and-transfer adjustments that this argument assumes.319
2. The Efficient Legal Rules Assumption
U.S. markets are regulated, and increasingly so.320 Competition
law and labor law govern product and labor markets. Securities, commodities, and banking regulations control financial markets. U.S.
trade, environmental, and immigration law—including their enforcement—govern their respective domains. According to the efficiencyonly argument, all these regulatory regimes should ignore distributional considerations and focus on efficiency.
This prescription presumes that all the rules and regulations in
question actually are efficient or may be made so. Yet as the discussion
in Part II reveals, it is increasingly clear that this assumption is as implausible as the assumption about the tax-and-transfer adjustments.
The prevailing view among economists appears to have undergone a
full reversal. Rather than viewing U.S. markets as generally efficient
(with some residual imperfections), economists now view these markets as generally inefficient (with some pockets of efficiency).
U.S. competition law, it turns out, has failed to prevent the rise of
monopoly power in product markets and monopsony power in the labor market. U.S. labor law has led to the decline of unions without
much improvement in labor market “rigidities” that unions were
thought to have caused.321 U.S. financial regulation has failed to prevent not only the Great Recession but flagrant manipulation of major

319. Joseph E. Stiglitz, one of the authors of the seminal 1976 article on which the
efficiency-only argument rests, Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 14, recently reached the
following conclusion after observing real-world distributional effects of actual policies
and policymakers’ failure to respond to these effects during four decades since the
publication of his paper: The “general result in the theory of optimal taxation and expenditures [is that] when there are distributive effects that cannot be undone by commodity taxes (including type-specific factor subsidies), production efficiency is in general not desirable.” Joseph E. Stiglitz, Addressing Climate Change Through Price and
Non-Price Interventions, 119 EUR. ECON. REV. 594, 603 (2019). Translation: When the
undesirable distributional effects of legal rules cannot be undone by targeted, fullycompensating transfers to the losers, the efficiency-only argument is generally not
valid.
320. See, e.g., German Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S. 55 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23583, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23583 [https://perma.cc/VS7E-X3GJ] (summarizing a steady increase in the mean number of government regulations governing many
industries).
321. See supra text accompanying notes 213–16.
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financial benchmarks.322 When legal scholars tested whether common
law evolves toward efficiency, they came away disappointed as
well.323 And one hardly needs to comment on the efficiency of U.S. immigration law, as it is currently enforced. It is safe to say that, at the
very least, the efficiency of numerous legal regimes discussed here is
in serious doubt.
So, what efficiency should be preserved by directing distributional adjustments away from legal rules? Why categorically ignore
the likely distributional effects of these rules if their efficiency is uncertain at best and will remain so for the foreseeable future? To be
sure, efficiency is important and pursuing it is essential for economic
growth. Some legal rules are clearly wasteful and adopting them is not
a good idea no matter what their distributional effects happen to be.
But given the doubts among economists and the law-and-economics
scholars about the efficiency of many legal rules as they exist in the
real world, the efficiency-only argument offers no reason to always
disregard distributional considerations in pursuit of efficiency benefits.
3. The Homogeneity Assumption
Kaplow and Shavell explain that the advantage of the tax-andtransfer system is that it treats individuals based on income, which is
the relevant characteristic for distributional purposes.324 Legal rules,
in contrast, are “often . . . confined to the small fraction of individuals
who find themselves involved in legal disputes . . . [and there is often]
substantial income variation within groups of plaintiffs and groups of
defendants (so that much redistribution will be in the wrong direction).”325
But the hardships of the China Shock, NAFTA, low-skill immigration (legal and illegal), and the monopsony power in labor markets are
not distributed solely based on income. Heterogeneity of individuals
that Kaplow and Shavell recognized326 and that others emphasized as
a limitation on their takeaway327 becomes crucially important here.
Geography and industry, in particular, play a major role.
A low-skill worker in New England has borne the brunt of Chinese competition; a low-skill worker in Oregon has barely noticed
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

See Krueger, supra note 222.
See supra note 226.
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 38, at 823.
Id.
See id. at 827–29.
See Avraham et al., supra note 74, at 1129–32.

2021]

DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS

1639

it.328 NAFTA hurt low-income workers in the Carolinas much more
than in Maryland or Montana.329 An income-based tax system is not
well-equipped to deal with these kinds of differences.
Heterogeneity limits the main takeaway of the efficiency-only argument only if it is unobserved. Otherwise, the tax-and-transfer system may base distribution on income plus an additional relevant observable factor.330 Given that economists had no idea how the China
Shock would play out across the country,331 and that they did not look
for geographically uneven effects of monopsony until the past few
years, heterogeneity has been, indeed, unobserved, often for a long
time.
Thus, if a worker lost a relatively well-paying job to trade liberalization and replaced it with two low-paying jobs that generate the
same total income (while working many more hours), the tax system
would not have recognized this worker as distributionally worse-off
compared to a similar worker whose job did not move overseas. Yet
the first worker’s losses may have been even greater than it appears
at first glance. In addition to losing a better paying job, that worker
may have lost a generous—and tax-exempt—benefits package, an
ability to work regular, predictable hours, and job security that came
with union membership that the worker no longer has. Even beyond
these costs, this worker may have experienced a “loss of a personal
sense of usefulness or dignity, loss of a sense of purpose, and loss of
coworker companionship.”332 Our tax system does not account for the
value of any of these benefits, so it cannot adjust for the harm of losing
them.
Of course, not knowing the location of unobservable distributional costs within income groups makes it difficult to adjust legal
rules—not just tax rules—to take these costs into account. But in some
cases, an adjustment to legal rules does have a significant advantage
in addressing unobserved heterogeneity, as explained in Part V.
***
Nothing in this discussion undermines the efficiency-only argument as a matter of theory. This Article takes no position about the
argument’s merits if the appropriate distributional changes are in-

328. See Autor et al., supra note 81, at 225.
329. See Hakobyan & McLaren, supra note 91, at 735.
330. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 38, at 827–30. Kaplow and Shavell offer
blindness as an example of such additional observable factor. Id. at 829 n.18.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 97–101.
332. Revesz, supra note 18, at 1518.
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deed made in the tax-and-transfer system, if legal rules are indeed efficient, and if there is no unobserved within-income-group heterogeneity. Nor does this Article assert that there has never been a tax-andtransfer adjustment of a kind that the efficiency-only argument recommends, that not a single actual legal rule is efficient, or that there is
always heterogeneity within income groups. The Article does conclude, however, that in many cases of great economic and social importance, one, two, or all three assumptions underlying the efficiencyonly argument fail to hold. So for real-world policymaking purposes,
one would be wise to appreciate the argument’s conceptual insights,
and then immediately proceed to considering actual distributional adjustments to both legal rules and the tax-and-transfer system in light
of the unintended distributional effects of major government policies.
B. THE NO-COMPENSATION ARGUMENT
1. The Private Risk Mitigation Assumption
In its essence, the no-compensation argument is a judgment
about the advantage of private ordering over government regulation.
In advancing the argument, Kaplow by no means ignores the individual’s need to insure against a variety of risks present in a market economy, including the risk of changes in government policy.333 At the
same time, the argument is sensitive to the well-known incentive
problems that insurance brings—adverse selection and moral hazard.334 After comparing the risk of losses from legal transitions to
other risks that individuals face, Kaplow concludes that there is no
fundamental difference between the two. “The prevailing assumption
in our society that market solutions for allocating risk are preferable
to government remedies is therefore equally applicable when the
risks to be allocated arise from legal transitions,”335 he concludes. The
market solutions that Kaplow has in mind are private insurance and
financial diversification.336
Given this reasoning, one clearly sees the limits of the argument.
If people do not (or cannot) anticipate the costs of future government
actions, the negative ex ante incentive effects of government compensation disappear. If losses are large, concentrated, and born by lowwealth individuals, risk mitigation is particularly important. And if

333.
334.
335.
336.

See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 511.
Id. at 537, 543.
Id. at 520.
See id. at 540–41.
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private insurance does not exist and financial diversification is unavailable, the government should step in.
All of these caveats apply to the distributional effects of the government policies discussed in Part II. To start, private risk mitigation
is, indeed, unavailable for the risks of unemployment, wage stagnation, skill obsolescence, and poverty. Kaplow recognizes this, and he
mentions government programs such as Social Security, unemployment insurance, and general income maintenance that protect millions of Americans from adverse market outcomes.337 But he explains
that “such programs are the exception in the vast universe of market
risks.”338 While this is true as far as it goes, risks of unemployment,
wage stagnation, and skill obsolescence—and the government’s failure to mitigate them—turned out to be of first-order economic and
political importance.
Not only market-based risk mitigation is unavailable for the particular market risks discussed here, but private insurance is not available for just about any risk of legal change. Shavell recently considered
the question thoroughly and confirmed what others noted earlier
based on weaker evidence: with some minor exceptions not relevant
here, legal risks are uninsurable.339 Without government intervention,
losses from legal change lie where they fall. But if no private insurance
is available, the logic of the no-compensation argument points toward
social insurance rather than away from it.
Kaplow himself mentions that social insurance may have an advantage over private insurance if different individuals have different
abilities to diversify or insure340 or if adjustment costs are high.341 Discussing the subject briefly, he “does not explore how significant these
issues are in practice, or in what contexts they are most important.”342
The context he generally considers is the effect of legal transitions on
337. See id. at 535 n.72.
338. Id. at 535. Indeed, as Kaplow says, “there is no general government compensation for new products that fail, production facilities that prove more costly than anticipated, or people who earn less than they had expected due to a variety of unfortunate circumstances.” Id.
339. See Steven Shavell, Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal
Change, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 366, 367 (2014). Jonathan Masur and Jonathan Nash
reached a similar conclusion and summarized earlier work. See Masur & Nash, supra
note 37, at 406–11, 416, 421.
340. In Kaplow’s discussion, this difference arises, for example, because “certain
individuals lack the information to use such markets to diversify risks created by the
possibility of changes in government policies.” Kaplow, supra note 15, at 550.
341. See id. at 592 n.254.
342. Id. at 550.
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businesses and investors.343 Subsequent literature on legal transitions
generally retains this focus.344
Shifting attention to low-skill, low-education workers whose
ability to insure their human capital or to diversify in financial markets is not just limited but altogether non-existent highlights the limits
of the no-compensation argument. When markets offer no risk mitigation, it can only come from the government.
Another reason for government insurance of transition losses is
the “probability misperception.”345 Kaplow suggests that some “less
sophisticated (often, less wealthy) individual investors” may lack incentives and skills to make proper risk assessments, leading them to
underinsure in private markets.346 Low-skill workers are even less financially sophisticated than less wealthy investors are. Risk assessments that these workers make are even less reliable. So, there is an
even stronger reason to mitigate transitional losses of these workers.
Kaplow views probability misperception as “perhaps the strongest case for some government response” to transitional losses,347 preferably in the form of compulsory government insurance.348 When
probability is unknown rather than misperceived, when even policy
experts and government agencies fail to anticipate the effects of their
policies, the case for a subsequent government intervention is even
stronger. And given that the government finances its social safety net
programs through (compulsory) income and payroll taxes, we already
have a compulsory insurance mechanism in place.349

343. “Of course, a substantial range of government reforms have their primary economic impact—in terms of transitions losses—on corporations and regular investors,
actors presumably best able to take advantage of market arrangements.” Id.; see also
id. at 527, 537, 540, 548–49, 596. Even when Kaplow discusses trade liberalization he
focuses on transitional losses incurred by businesses, not workers. See Louis Kaplow,
Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 180
(2003).
344. See Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 158–
59 (2003); Logue, supra note 74, at 213, 225–28 (distinguishing corporations from individual investors because only the latter are subject to cognitive biases); Ramseyer &
Nakazato, supra note 18, at 1158 n.11 (“We deal only with transitional rules applicable
to investments.”).
345. Kaplow, supra note 15, at 548.
346. See id. at 548–49.
347. Id. at 548.
348. See id. at 549.
349. I am not arguing that this mechanism currently reflects the appropriate premiums (whatever “appropriate” means in this context). I only point out that the mechanism itself is already in place.
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Finally, Kaplow recognized that “more concentrated gains or
losses would present a stronger case for corrective action.”350 Michael
Graetz viewed the magnitude of transitional losses as the main reason
to offer relief as well.351 Losses discussed in this Article are both large
and concentrated. They present a particularly compelling case for government assistance.
In sum, the theoretical argument against the government’s mitigation of transitional losses does not apply to the policies discussed
here on the argument’s own terms. No private risk mitigation is available. Even if it were available, probability misperceptions are likely to
be severe. The relevant probabilities may be unknown altogether.
Overall, then, all key assumptions underlying the no-compensation argument do not hold for the momentous legal transitions discussed in
this Article.
This conclusion about the no-compensation argument is new to
the literature. In retrospect, this may seem surprising. Kaplow was
well aware that risky investments in capital include investments in
human capital352 and that some losses should be insured by government because no private alternative is available.353 Yet he did not view
these issues as affecting his overall conclusion.
Kaplow’s assumptions have been questioned by others. Scholars
pointed out that private insurance is not available in specific markets
and circumstances, such as for land takings,354 retroactive changes to
protected rights355 and statuses,356 and so on. The entire 2003 issue of
the Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues was dedicated to the analysis
of legal transitions.357 Yet none of the nine contributors to the issue
350. Kaplow, supra note 15, at 596.
351. See Graetz, supra note 58, at 87; see also Michael J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1826 (1985). Graetz’s reason to compensate taxpayers suffering large losses is political expediency of allowing for some compensation in order
to enact otherwise desirable changes. Graetz, supra. In his most recent work Graetz
argues for a broad-based transition assistance program similar to the one suggested
here. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, THE WOLF AT THE DOOR: THE MENACE OF ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND HOW TO FIGHT IT 201–38 (2020).
352. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 516 n.7.
353. See id. at 535.
354. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 592–97 (1984).
355. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1795 (1991) (doubting availability of
insurance for retroactive invalidation of police investigative techniques).
356. See Fisch, supra note 18, at 1090 (questioning availability of insurance for retroactive repeals of sovereign immunity of public officials).
357. See 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1–311 (2003).
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(ten, including Kaplow himself), nor any other scholars writing about
legal transitions, raised the objections made here. What explains this
omission?
A book published in 2003 by the distinguished economist Robert
Shiller suggests the answer. The book advocated a major reform of U.S.
social insurance to address the multiplicity of new risks facing individuals in a modern capitalist economy. This multiplicity made it impossible for the government or private markets to offer insurance tailored to each specific risk, Shiller explained.358 So a new general
insurance scheme was needed.
To bolster his argument, Shiller offered a long list of possible
threats to individuals’ livelihoods. A country’s national income, he
wrote, may fall due to population growth, due to changes in monetary
policy, energy prices, returns to social capital, returns to educational
investment, public confidence in the economy, and so on.359 Of course,
there are individual career risks as well.360
Having considered this long list of risks, the closest Shiller came
to mentioning the risk of adverse distributional impacts discussed in
Part II were the risks of “fluctuations in the strength of cartels, or to
changes in public support of labor unions.”361 He cited a 1986 article
about a super-game-theoretic model of price wars for the former, and
evidence from the Great Depression for the latter.362 Shiller also discussed immigration, acknowledging that it can “frustrate the efforts
[of] any . . . one country to manage the distribution of income within
its borders.”363 He panned the U.S. immigration regime of strict laws
and lax enforcement as “crazy.”364 But his takeaway was a proposal
for auctioning immigration rights, not a call for assisting American
workers disadvantaged by the government’s “crazy” immigration policy.
Shiller is a Nobel Laureate in economics who is deeply interested
in social insurance.365 His lack of awareness of the market distortions
and distributional burdens discussed in Part II was a sign of the times.
358. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 58–
59 (2003).
359. See id. at 60–61.
360. Shiller offers an example of a risk of being drafted in the army during the war.
See id. at 62.
361. Id. at 60.
362. See id.
363. Id. at 159.
364. Id.
365. Robert Shiller, YALE SCH. MGMT., https://som.yale.edu/faculty/robert-shiller
[https://perma.cc/WD8C-DNPW].
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Just eighteen years ago, one of the best economists in the world—and
one with great empathy for the plight of those struggling to succeed in
the modern U.S. economy—simply did not see the losses that government decisions were imposing on these very people. Today these
losses are impossible to ignore. Indeed, the 2019 book by two recent
Nobel Prize Laureates emphasizes that “one of our main argument[s]
. . . has been that we need to worry about transitions.”366 The magnitude and persistence of transitional losses surely limits the plausible
scope of the no-compensation argument.367
2. The Arbitrariness Assumption
Addressing the theoretical analysis of legal transitions does not
end the discussion of the no-compensation argument. Theory aside,
what if the practical obstacles to compensating transitional losers are
insurmountable? This is precisely what many have argued about the
most significant U.S. transitional assistance program, the TAA.
These arguments have merit. The TAA does raise difficult linedrawing questions. Scholars and policy experts flagged them before
the program was enacted, and these questions have persisted ever
since.368 It turned out to be very difficult to delineate people and companies who suffered from trade liberalization enough to justify government assistance, to determine the form of that assistance, and to
decide on the program’s generosity.369 More fundamentally, TAA’s defenders never articulated a convincing explanation for why the government should help only those who suffered from free trade—and
not other government decisions and private market shifts.
366. ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, GOOD ECONOMICS FOR HARD TIMES 92
(2019).
367. Steven Shavell offers another reason why the no-compensation argument
does not always hold. When the legal rule is of a threshold type (also known in the lawand-economics literature as negligence, fault-based, or, in Shavell’s article in question,
a legal standard), and if the private parties were required to make lasting investments
in order to satisfy the threshold and avoid liability, grandfathering or some other form
of transition assistance is socially desirable. But if the relevant legal regime is that of
strict liability, the no-compensation argument holds. See Steven Shavell, On Optimal
Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. Legal Stud. 37, 81–82 (2008).
Shavell’s argument does not inform the present analysis of the transitional issues.
Workers affected by free trade, for example, were not told by the government, on the
pain of legal sanctions, to acquire human capital in the auto or textile industry (impacted by trade liberalization) rather than nursing or primary education (which were
impacted very little). So in the relevant sense, the legal regime governing the decisions
of these workers is that of a strict liability.
368. See HORNBECK, supra note 28; ALDEN, supra note 7, at 115–22; Masur & Nash,
supra note 37, at 441–42; Wilcox, supra note 16, at 884–89.
369. Wilcox, supra note 16, at 887–88.
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But all these objections to transitional assistance are largely beside the point today. As Part II reveals, it was not only U.S. trade policy
that unintentionally harmed low-skill American workers. Widespread
labor market monopsony resulting from weak enforcement of U.S.
competition laws likely harmed these workers as well. The same is
likely true of U.S. labor policy, immigration policy, and environmental
regulation. Given these findings, a targeted adjustment program of the
future needs much less targeting compared to the TAA. Rather than
separating workers harmed by free trade from those harmed by other
government decisions discussed here, this program would need to target low-skill workers as a group. Such broad targeting would not suffer from the arbitrariness embedded in the TAA, eliminating the remaining support for the no-compensation argument.
***
To be clear, the critique of the no-compensation argument offered here is broad but not boundless. The Article does not assert that
the assumptions underlying this argument always fail. What the Article does claim, however, is that these assumptions proved to be implausible in an economically, socially, and politically important case of
unintentional transitional losses imposed on low-skill American
workers by the government policies discussed in Part II. For these
workers, the logic of the no-compensation argument calls for substantial government assistance.
V. POLICY DIRECTIONS
If policymakers ever viewed the efficiency-only and no-compensation arguments as constraining actual policy choices, the discussion
in the previous Part should remove these constraints. Yet if policymakers were to start considering how to reflect distribution in the design of legal rules and how to structure transition relief, questions
would immediately arise. What legal rules should be tested for distributional impacts? What do distributionally motivated adjustments to
legal rules look like? And what adjustments should be made to the taxand-transfer system to provide transition relief? This Part suggests
that in principle, these questions may be answered. But details of policy design are beyond the Article’s scope.
A. ATTENTION TO DISTRIBUTION
If policymakers decide to pay more attention to the distributional
effects of their policies, they will need to determine which policies to
scrutinize. This Article’s discussion suggests two answers.

2021]

DISTRIBUTIONAL ARGUMENTS

1647

First, distributional concerns should loom large if the efficiency
benefits of a policy are small or questionable and if significant distributional effects are possible. State occupational licensing requirements are a clear example of legal rules of questionable efficiency.370
Federal antitrust authorities’ acquiescence (until recently) in proliferation of non-compete agreements—especially for low-skill workers—
is another example.371 Land-use restrictions are also highly suspect.372
Second, policymakers should consider distributional impacts of
some policies that are likely to be socially beneficial overall. If these
policies do not aim to redistribute, if they have a known potential to
produce significant winners and losers, and if there is great uncertainty about the magnitude and location of the resulting gains and
losses, distribution should enter the analysis. Trade liberalization is
an obvious example of such policy; environmental regulation may well
fit the description too. Sometimes, it may be unclear whether a particular policy fits this description. But some important policies surely do,
and policymakers should monitor their distributional impacts closely
both when enacting them and over time.
B. DISTRIBUTIONALLY INFORMED LEGAL RULES
Having identified the types of legal rules that should be potentially adjusted on account of their distributional impacts, what kinds
of adjustments should policymakers consider?
For the rules in the first category, the adjustments are straightforward. If state-specific occupational licensing, local land-use regulations, and non-compete agreements are borderline efficient (at best),
policymakers should decrease the licensing coverage, eliminate some
land-use restrictions, and restrict or ban non-competes. The federal
government has many ways of intervening to achieve these goals. It

370. See supra text accompanying notes 274–76.
371. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 143. Non-compete agreements that bind
low-skill workers are especially problematic for three reasons. First, they reduce geographic mobility of these workers who are already immobile due to financial demands
of relocations. Second, given financial and educational constraints, low-skill workers
are particularly unlikely to obtain legal advice that would inform them that many noncompetes are not legally binding. Third, the standard justifications of these agreements
as protecting employers’ investments in employees and sharing of valuable information with employees do not apply to low-skill workers. Id.
372. See Furman & Orszag, supra note 127, at 26–29; Ganong & Shoag, supra note
269, at 76–79; Schleicher, supra note 269, at 114–17.
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can reform U.S. competition law and enforcement,373 preempt state licensing schemes, induce interstate compacts harmonizing them, or
even threaten antitrust action against uncooperative states.374 Congress can influence state and local zoning policies as well.375 The
larger the distributional losses in question, the greater should be the
burden of demonstrating the efficiency gains of policies that impose
these losses.376
Changes to policies in the second category—those that generally
are socially beneficial even if distributionally problematic—are not as
obvious. This Article suggests that slowing down the pace of change is
one possibility. A more gradual trade liberalization, or a slower relaxation of antitrust enforcement, would have softened the impacts described in Part II and would have given academics and policymakers
time to identify these impacts. Moreover, these kinds of adjustments
to legal rules would have made later tax-and-transfer system adjustments more informed and more effective.
Note that in order to slow trade liberalization or to relax antitrust
enforcement more gradually Congress only needs to recognize the
possibility of distributional concerns. If future distributional impacts
are highly uncertain (including the uncertainty about unobserved
within-income-group heterogeneity), recognizing the possibility of
distributional impacts is the best Congress can do for some time. In
contrast, Congress cannot deploy offsetting distributional adjustments through the tax-and-transfer system until Congress has a good
idea of who suffered and how much. That knowledge emerges only after a delay. So, there is a clear tradeoff between possibly more efficient
but delayed tax-and-transfer adjustments and possibly less efficient
but timely distributional adjustments to legal rules.
In thinking about this tradeoff, it is important to keep in mind that
the delayed adjustments through the tax system may be not only untimely, but impossible (or grossly inadequate). To take a stark example, what tax or transfer program would compensate today a worker
who lost his job due to the China Shock fifteen years ago? What if this

373. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 143, at 12–13 (suggesting reforms of competition law); Schleicher, supra note 269, at 150–54.
374. See Schleicher, supra note 269, at 121–22, 151 (discussing the federal government’s ability to diminish state licensing and zoning regulation).
375. See id. at 151.
376. For instance, Barkai concludes that “the value of this increase in pure profits
amounts to over $1.2 trillion in 2014, or $14.6 thousand for each of the approximately
81 million employees of the nonfinancial corporate sector.” Barkai, supra note 128, at
2423. Distributional shifts of this magnitude surely deserve congressional attention.
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worker got depressed, divorced, and addicted to opioids?377 Distributional adjustment through the tax system may come so late that it
would be, indeed, “too late to compensate free trade’s losers.”378
Needless to say, temporizing policy changes has its own costs. Delaying socially beneficial changes defers their benefits. It is more difficult to identify causal effects of small changes compared to large ones
econometrically. Gradual changes require constant action by the government—a challenge in our system of checks and balances.379
These concerns are real, but not determinative. NAFTA tariff reductions, for instance, could have been phased in—or phased in more
slowly—without any additional legislation or budget negotiations.380
The same is true of the loosening of antitrust enforcement. The executive could have varied the timing of tariff reductions across the country as well, allowing economists to measure the differential effects.
These are just some examples. On the other hand, experience shows
that even a dramatic change such as the China Shock would not force
policymakers to act if they are unwilling do so.381
Notably, Graetz, Kaplow, and Shavell have all mentioned slowing
down the rate of legal change as a possible response to governmentinduced distributional losses. Shavell suggested recently that legal
change should be “attenuated,” including through a delayed or gradual
implementation of new laws, after concluding that private insurance
against legal change does not exist.382 Graetz explained that if losses
are large, “efficiency and fairness concerns may suggest that phased377. These are not mere hypotheticals. See generally NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, MEN
WITHOUT WORK: AMERICA’S INVISIBLE CRISIS (2016); Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott,
Trade Liberalization and Mortality: Evidence from US Counties, 2 AM. ECON. REV.: INSIGHTS 47, 47 (2020).
378. Dani Rodrik, Too Late To Compensate Free Trade’s Losers, PITT. POST-GAZETTE
(Apr. 15, 2017), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2017/04/16/Too
-late-to-compensate-free-trade-s-losers/stories/201704160069 [https://perma.cc/
AM34-7V3M].
379. Note also that compensating transitional losers by temporizing legal change
affects the source of compensation. Immediate legal reform followed by compensating
transitional losers from general revenues disperses the burden of paying compensation among all taxpayers. Slower legal reform places the burden of compensating the
losers on putative winners whose benefits from the slower reform are delayed. See
Joseph J. Cordes & Burton A. Weisbrod, When Government Programs Create Inequities:
A Guide to Compensation Policies, 4 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 178, 187 (1985).
380. Some of NAFTA’s tariff-elimination provisions were indeed phased in. See M.
ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) 17 (2017).
381. See supra Part II.
382. See Shavell, supra note 339, at 368, 394.
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in or delayed effective dates be used to mitigate that impact.”383
Kaplow concluded that slowing the pace of change would be less efficient than letting private markets operate without government interference.384 Yet he also mentioned that this conclusion may change if
different individuals have different abilities to diversify or insure385 or
when adjustment costs are high.386
We now know that it would be difficult to overstate the significance of the concerns just mentioned for low-skill American workers.
Thus, slowing down the pace of legal change is an option that should
be on the table in appropriate cases. This conclusion is another example of the Article’s overarching claim. Once the assumptions underlying the two distributional arguments are changed to reflect reality, the
arguments’ objections to distributionally sensitive legal rules turn to
endorsements.387
C. TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE AND UNIFORM SOCIAL INSURANCE
Changing legal rules on account of distribution may be good policy sometimes, but there is little doubt that the tax-and-transfer system should do much of the work. This Article’s analysis points to two
directions for reforming that system.
First, the country needs a broad-based, well-funded, federally administered (that is, nationally uniform) transitional assistance program for low-skill workers. This is hardly a new idea. Whether offered
as a reform of unemployment insurance388 or as a stand-alone program,389 transitional assistance for blue-collar workers has been proposed and discussed for decades.390 This Article’s contribution is to
383. Graetz, supra note 58, at 87; see also Graetz, supra note 356 (stating that
“phased-in or delayed effective dates should often be used instead of grandfathering
to mitigate particularly large losses that result from changes in the law”).
384. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 592 (discussing phase-ins).
385. In Kaplow’s discussion, this difference arises, for example, because “certain
individuals lack the information to use such markets to diversify risks created by the
possibility of changes in government policies.” Id. at 550.
386. See id. at 592 n.254.
387. For different suggestions of how to reflect distributional considerations in the
design of legal rules, see Liscow, supra note 315, at 1698–1700.
388. See ALDEN, supra note 7, at 119, 122 (summarizing President Nixon’s and
President Obama’s proposals).
389. For a recent proposal, see GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 351. See also ISABEL
SAWHILL, THE FORGOTTEN AMERICANS: AN ECONOMIC AGENDA FOR A DIVIDED NATION 108–26
(2018) (proposing a “GI Bill” for American workers).
390. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION IN
A COMPETITIVE SOCIETY 27–28 (1986) (urging new national institutions to “address the
needs of all displaced workers”); Richard A. Givens, The Search for an Alternative to
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demonstrate that given the recent developments in the U.S. economy,
the no-compensation argument, including its arbitrariness prong,
does not apply to such a broad-based program.
Second, if Congress decided to alleviate the hardships that it has
unintentionally imposed on blue-collar American workers, it would
need to reform the American social insurance system in the direction
that is the exact opposite of what Congress has been doing in recent
decades.391 Rather than devolving authority to design various parts of
the American social safety net to the states, Congress needs to reclaim
this authority and make this safety net simpler, more transparent, and
nationally uniform.
There is now strong evidence that congressional policies have led
to many local labor market shocks.392 There is growing evidence that
these shocks are large and persistent. Given that low-skill workers do
not relocate to where opportunities are, facilitating geographic mobility of these workers is an obvious avenue for improvement. A system
where the federal unemployment insurance scheme, to take one example, “results in essentially 53 different programs” with vastly different requirements and benefits is indefensible.393
All reform directions suggested here give rise to tradeoffs, and no
single policy dominates the rest. So, the final policy suggestion is that
policymakers should pursue solutions in all directions at the same
time. A major benefit of this multi-prong approach is that the success
of one type of response will alleviate the pressure to succeed in others.
If social insurance and public assistance become more generous and
more nationally uniform, leading to a greater geographic mobility of
low-skill workers and lowering their adjustment costs, the transitional assistance program and a slower legal change would become
less important.394 If policymakers design a highly effective transitional
Protection, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 40 n.125 (1961) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2571 (repealed
1973)); Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilcock, A Better Way To Help U.S. Victims of
Free Trade, BLOOMBERG: OP. (Dec. 2, 2016, 10:29 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
opinion/articles/2016-12-02/a-better-way-to-help-u-s-victims-of-free-trade
[https://perma.cc/3EB4-SA24] (urging better work training, rationalizing multiple
federal programs, improving TAA, and advocating greater spending for all of these purposes).
391. See supra Part III.C.
392. See, e.g., WHITTAKER & ISAACS, supra note 31, at 2.
393. Id.
394. Arguably, this approach reflects the social policy in Nordic countries. See Michael Cembalest, Lost in Space: The Search for Democratic Socialism in the Real World,
and How I Ended Up Halfway Around the Globe from Where I Began, J.P. MORGAN: EYE ON
MKT. (June 24, 2019), https://am.jpmorgan.com/gi/getdoc/1383625713370
[https://perma.cc/5JMM-FST3].
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assistance program for blue-collar workers, the need to temporize legal change and to reform the general safety net would diminish.395 Not
all suggestions made here are interconnected in this way,396 but many
are, and pursuing all of them will increase the overall chance of success.
VI. THE THREE OBJECTIONS
The policy approaches just discussed are general, and they are
general by design. There are many thoughtful, detailed policy proposals consistent with the approaches suggested here, and there have
been many such proposals over time.397 But even this Article’s general
suggestions to adjust legal rules and the tax-and-transfer system on
account of the unintended distributional impacts of some government
policies are likely to give rise to equally general objections. Without a
claim to comprehensiveness, this Part takes on several of them.
A. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS ARE TOO UNCERTAIN
The first objection is that uncertainty about future unintended
distributional consequences of government policies is so great, and
our knowledge of distributional impacts is so speculative, that no distributional adjustments are possible in practice. A shorter version of
this argument is that U.S. policymakers cannot do any better in the future than they have done in the past.
395. The design of such effective programs still eludes policymakers around the
globe. See, e.g., Esther Duflo, The Economist as Plumber, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2017)
(describing the disappointing results of a rigorous test of a well-designed French reform of unemployment insurance); Dayanand S. Manoli, Marios Michaelides & Ankur
Patel, Long-Term Effects of Job-Search Assistance: Experimental Evidence Using Administrative Tax Data 7–8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24422, 2018),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24422 [https://perma.cc/YW8W-3MVK] (reporting
the limited success of a recent state job-search assistance program, comparing it to
even smaller effects of similar, earlier efforts).
396. If, for instance, the government is choosing between two possible legal rules
that it believes to be roughly equally efficient, the government should prefer the rule
with better distributional consequences whatever happens to the general safety net,
transitional assistance programs, and so on.
397. E.g., GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 351 (discussing a broad transition assistance program); GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 26 (offering detailed proposals for improving the U.S. social safety net, including unemployment insurance); Revesz, supra
note 18, at 1566–72 (arguing that incorporating distributional considerations into the
analysis of environmental regulation is a reachable goal); SAWHILL, supra note 389
(suggesting transitional assistance for workers and social security reform); HAMILTON
PROJECT, PLACE-BASED POLICIES FOR SHARED ECONOMIC GROWTH (Jay Shambaugh & Ryan
Nunn eds., 2018) (discussing place-based strategies); KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note
143, at 12–13 (proposing reforms to reduce labor market monopsony).
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Distributional changes are indeed difficult to assess and even
more difficult to predict. Evaluating distributional impacts simply requires more information than forecasting future economic growth,
employment interest rates, revenues, and so on.
Say we want to study the distributional impact of the China
Shock. First, we would need to develop a model that would predict the
consequences: what production (if any) moves to China; what production (if any) moves to the United States? Second, we would need to
estimate this model empirically, finding the relevant magnitudes and
elasticities. But these findings would not be nearly enough to determine distributional impacts. As Autor and his colleagues explain, we
would also need to ask
[t]o what extent are trade-induced industry employment contractions offset
by employment gains elsewhere in the US economy, potentially outside of
trade-impacted regions?
. . . Do trade adjustments occur on the employment margin, the wage margin,
or both? . . .
Are the costs of trade adjustment borne disproportionately by workers employed at trade-impacted firms and residing in trade-impacted local labor
markets? Or do these shocks diffuse nationally, thus moderating their concentrated effects?398

To answer these questions, we would need to find out what happens up and down the supply chains both in the industries directly
affected by foreign competition and, crucially, in the industries that
are relatively unaffected by that competition but benefit from cheaper
inputs resulting from it. We would also need to consider the possible
effects on productivity399 and on consumer prices.400 If consumers
gain, we would need to compare these gains to losses resulting from
disappearing jobs and stagnant wages. This is not a full list of questions that would need to be answered to determine all distributional
impacts of free trade.401
Or consider distributional consequences of monopoly power. To
understand them, researchers would first need to determine whether
this power exists and to what extent—not a trivial task. But this would
398. Autor et al., supra note 81, at 223.
399. In particular, would productivity be affected at all? If so, in what sectors, and
through what channels? All of this is still unclear. See id. at 228.
400. For example, gains from trade may disproportionately benefit the poor because poor consumers spend relatively more on cheap imported goods. See Pablo D.
Fajgelbaum & Amit K. Khandelwal, Measuring the Unequal Gains from Trade, 131 Q.J.
ECON. 1113, 1116–17 (2016).
401. For example, what if competition with China boosts U.S. innovation, eventually benefitting both U.S. workers and U.S. consumers? See Autor et al., supra note 81,
at 228–29.
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only begin the analysis. Market power allows firms to earn windfall
returns. When the U.S. Department of Treasury makes distributional
estimates, it assigns all such returns to owners of capital (shareholders).402 So it would seem that greater market power necessarily benefits the wealthy. But several studies suggest that European workers
capture a significant share of corporate rents and that U.S. workers
captured some rents in the past.403 Granted, U.S. labor is vastly less
powerful than it used to be and much less powerful than it is in Europe
today. But the possibility of rent-sharing remains. Indeed, the most recent analysis suggests that U.S. workers get roughly one-half of significant rents captured by U.S. firms.404 Here too, however, high-skill
workers do much better than low-skill ones.405
There is no doubt that distributional projections are more complex and less precise than the forecasts of the standard economic indicators. But it is a mistake to use this comparison as a justification for
not making distributional adjustments. That is because the uncertainty about common economic forecasts is great as well. Great
enough, that is, for the forecasters to be wrong time and again.
Start at the top, with the U.S. Congress. It has a knack for trying to
regulate behavior through the tax code. In 1993, for example, it de-

402. See OFF. OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY’S DISTRIBUTIONAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 2 (2015), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/
131/Summary-of-Treasurys-Distribution-Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8VR
-55AA] (“The share of the corporate income tax that represents a tax on supernormal
returns is assumed to be borne by shareholders.”). In fact, the Department estimates
that windfall profits are mostly earned by the top one percent of earners. See Julie Anne
Cronin, Emily Y. Lin, Laura Power & Michael Cooper, Distributing the Corporate Income
Tax: Revised U.S. Treasury Methodology, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 239, 256 (2013) (“Families in
the top 1 percent of the income distribution receive 51.2 percent of corporate supernormal capital income [windfall profits], 64.3 percent of non-corporate supernormal
capital income, and 45.6 percent of normal capital income.”).
403. Cf. Emmanuel Saez, Benjamin Schoefer & David Seim, Payroll Taxes, Firm Behavior, and Rent Sharing: Evidence from a Young Workers’ Tax Cut in Sweden, 109 AM.
ECON. REV. 1717, 1717 n.1 (2019); see also Farber et al., supra note 166, at 1–2 (summarizing the literature); Furman & Orszag, supra note 117, at 20, 37–38 (offering rentsharing between suppliers of capital and labor as a possible explanation for a rise in
inequality and a decline in labor mobility, citing research showing the existence of such
rent-sharing in the United States in the 1970s).
404. See Thibaut Lamadon, Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, Imperfect Competition, Compensating Differentials and Rent Sharing in the U.S. Labor Market 46 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25954, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/
w25954/w25954 [https://perma.cc/5ZGP-DGCL].
405. See id. at 28.
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cided to deny a compensation deduction for any payment to a corporate executive in excess of one million dollars unless the payment was
performance based.406
Congress being a collective body, it is difficult to attribute to it a
single purpose for enacting the rule. One goal was to limit executive
pay—a prominent issue during the 1992 presidential election.407 “The
committee believes that excessive compensation will be reduced if the
deduction for compensation (other than performance-based compensation) paid to the top executives of publicly held corporations is limited to $1 million per year,” the House report explained.408 What followed, however, was the exact opposite of what Congress intended to
achieve. One million in cash became a floor—not a ceiling—for any
self-respecting executive.409 Congress’s failure of imagination did not
stop it from attempting to impose a similar restriction twenty-five
years later (this time on tax-exempt organizations) while expecting a
different result.410
An alternative justification for the 1993 limitation on executive
compensation was to improve corporate governance by tying executive pay, no matter how high, to the company’s performance.411 That,
too, did not happen.412 Or, perhaps, the 1993 limitation aimed to give
406. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, H.R. 2264, 103d Cong. (1993)
(adding section 162(m) to the Internal Revenue Code).
407. See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got
There, in 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 211, 277–79 (George M. Constantinides, René M. Stulz & Milton Harris eds., 2013) (reporting statements of several
presidential aspirants, including Bill Clinton).
408. H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 646 (1993).
409. “[T]he pay trend makes it look as if [162(m)] were passed with the intention
of accelerating, not curbing, CEO pay increases.” CEO Compensation in the Post-Enron
Era: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Brian Hall, Associate Professor, Harvard Business School). “[W]hile there is
some evidence that companies paying base salaries in excess of $1 million lowered
salaries to $1 million following the enactment of Section 162(m), many others raised
salaries that were below $1 million to exactly $1 million.” Murphy, supra note 407, at
278–79 (internal citations omitted).
410. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-409, at 333 (2017) (expanding the excise tax on compensation in excess of $1 million to apply to tax-exempt organizations). The House
Ways and Means Committee cited in support of the measure its belief “that excessive
compensation . . . diverts resources from those particular purposes” that Congress
aimed to encourage by granting the tax-exempt status. Id. Lesson not learned.
411. See Executive Compensation: Hearing on S. 1198, H.R. 4727, and H.R. 5260 Before the Subcomm. on Tax’n of the S. Comm. on Fin., 102d Cong. 1–3 (1992) (opening
statement of Sen. David L. Boren, Chairman, Subcomm. on Tax’n of the S. Comm. on
Fin.).
412. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 121–43 (2004) (explaining why even stock
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shareholders more power over corporate boards. Alas, that did not occur either.413
Perhaps Congress is not the best example of forecast failures.
Maybe some senators and representatives knew all along that the one
million restriction and “performance-based” rules would improve
nothing. Maybe these legislators were happy to indulge their naïve
colleagues in their confused efforts. What about the Federal Reserve—
a non-partisan assembly of economic experts?
Benn Steil, a monetary economist and an astute observer of the
Fed, summarized the results of the Fed’s forecasts:
The Fed started publishing the Board of Governors’ and Reserve Banks’
three-year forecasts in October 2007. At that time, the GDP growth forecasts
among this group of 17 ranged from 2.2% to 2.7%. Actual 2010 GDP growth
was 3%, outside the Fed’s range.
The Fed forecasters told us that unemployment in 2010 would be in a
range between 4.6% and 5%. In fact, it averaged about twice that, or 9.6%.
The forecasters further predicted that both Personal Consumption Expenditures inflation (PCE, similar to CPI) and core PCE inflation would be in a range
from 1.5% and 2%. The former came in at 1.3% and the latter at 1%, again
outside the Fed’s range. The Fed’s scorecard on its 2007 three-year forecasts:
0 for 4.
In short, the Fed’s premise that it can speak with authority about the future is flawed. During the two decades [ending in] 2006, its own experts were
worse than outside ones in predicting one-year economic data. Since the start
of the crisis in 2007, its three-year predictions have been worthless.414

To the Fed’s credit, it is cutting back on its forecasting business.
But this retrenchment took some time, dismal results notwithstanding.415
Or consider another non-partisan expert body—the CBO. Its success in projecting budgetary costs of various programs is decidedly
mixed. Some of its projections were remarkably accurate. For instance, the CBO’s forecast of the unemployment benefits under the

options generally viewed as performance-based compensation and treated as such by
the tax code in fact bear only a weak relationship to corporate success).
413. See id. at 196–97.
414. Benn Steil, Why We Can’t Believe the Fed, WALL ST. J.: OP. (Feb. 22, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702046529045771970-10637908
348 [https://perma.cc/YB5F-ZZN2].
415. See Benn Steil & Benjamin Della Rocca, The Fed Finally Unties Its Own Hands,
WALL ST. J.: OP. (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fed-finally-unties
-its-own-hands-1540247559 [https://perma.cc/T86X-J4RJ].
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Emergency Unemployment Compensation program was just five percent off.416 But the CBO predictions of the revenue brought by spectrum auctions missed the mark by thirty percent—in both directions
on various occasions.417 The CBO was off by thirty-five percent estimating the cost of Medicare Part D (the administration’s estimates
were even more flawed).418 And it understated the decline in corporate tax revenues in the wake of the 2017 tax reform by a factor of
two.419 Needless to say, the CBO has not stopped producing estimates,
and Congress has not stopped passing budgets based on them.
It is all but inevitable that distributional projections will be sometimes mistaken even if they are based on the most sophisticated econometric techniques and are constantly reviewed and revised. Yet
these mistakes will be neither unique nor unfamiliar. Similar mistakes
happen time and again when Congress, the Federal Reserve, other
agencies, and numerous state legislatures adopt policies based on imperfect forecasts of future productivity, employment, interest rates,
economic growth, and so on. And just as all those policies continue despite prior misses and even occasional failures of the underlying forecasts, so should the distributional projections and distributional adjustments become a standard part of policymakers’ toolkit.
The final point is that the implications of emphasizing distributional uncertainty are decidedly one-sided. I am not aware of a single
major policy enacted in the past four decades that over-compensated
distributional losers because the proper level of compensation was so
difficult to ascertain. Instead, distributional uncertainty is inevitably
used to justify under-compensating those who bear disproportionate
costs. These asymmetric results ought to loom large in evaluating calls
for inaction in light of distributional uncertainty.
B. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS TAKE TOO LONG TO REVEAL THEMSELVES
Another objection emphasizes not uncertainty but time. Distributional impacts take so long to reveal themselves in the data, the objection goes, that the government would be reacting to yesterday’s (or,
416. See Doug Elmendorf, The Accuracy of CBO’s Budget Projections, CBO: BLOG
(Mar. 25, 2013), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/44017 [https://perma.cc/23DU
-2U65].
417. See id.
418. See id.
419. See Brian Faler, Big Businesses Paying Even Less than Expected Under GOP Tax
Law, POLITICO (June 13, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/13/big
-businesses-pay-less-tax-law-1364591 [https://perma.cc/EVN8-7956] (reporting
that corporate tax revenue in 2018 experienced “almost twice the decline official
budget forecasters had predicted”).
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more precisely, years’ old) news if it tries to respond to distributional
impacts when it discovers them.
This objection doubles as an explanation for the U.S. government’s failure to address the unintended distributional burdens of its
policies for decades. But as recent research shows, the troubling distributional effects of the policies discussed in Part II—or at least major
red flags suggesting these effects—could have been discovered a decade or two ago.
Consider labor mobility once again. The key assumption of trade
economists in the 1990s was that distributional effects of trade are
minor because U.S. workers are highly mobile. Labor mobility is also
key for the analysis of the monopsony power in labor markets. If
workers can pick up and leave any place that has only a few employers
trying to hold down wages, wages will equilibrate nationwide, and no
employer would be able to exert market power. A similar analysis applies to the geographically concentrated costs of environmental regulation. Clearly, labor mobility is very important for distributional outcomes.

Figure 1. Share of U.S. residents who moved during the past year,
1947–2016.420
Figure 1 shows how Americans moved in the past seven decades.
The decline is dramatic. Between 1945 and 1965 about twenty percent of U.S. residents moved during any previous year. By 2015 that
share dropped almost by half. As importantly for our purposes, this
420. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ADDRESSING AMERICA’S RESKILLING CHALLENGE 5 fig.1
(2018).
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decline is not recent. It started in the 1960s, briefly reversed in the
mid-1980s, and has continued without interruption since then.421
Maybe economists looking at Figure 1 in the early 1990s would not
have seen a cause for concern. But by 2000 the decline would have
been impossible to ignore. Economists, it appears, simply did not look
for some time.
Now consider the evidence of offshoring—American jobs moving
abroad. Figure 2 shows the trends in employment of U.S. and foreign
workers by multinational firms. Note that these trends do not show all
offshoring job losses. If GM moved a plant from Michigan to its Mexican subsidiary, Figure 2 reflects the change. But if Magnavox’s U.S. TV
manufacturing simply disappeared while Samsung’s South Korean
production revved up, the resulting American job losses would be in
addition to those depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Trends in domestic (dark line) and affiliate (light lines) employment among multinational firms.422

421. See Benmelech et al., supra note 147, at 2; De Loecker & Eeckhout, supra note
198, at 27–28.
422. Avraham Ebenstein, Ann Harrison, Margaret McMillan & Shannon Phillips, Estimating the Impact of Trade and Offshoring on American Workers Using the Current
Population Surveys, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 581, 586 fig.2 (2014).
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One does not need a Ph.D. in economics to see that by the mid1990s the trend was as clear as it was disturbing. Yet the first empirical work investigating the distributional consequences of NAFTA and
the China Shock did not appear until 2010.423 (Note that “low-income
employment”—the rising dashed line in Figure 2—refers to employment in low-income countries, not U.S. employment of low-income
workers.424)
The point is certainly not that trade economists missed some obvious changes in the economy. There are many ways to slice the data
and look at employment. Just in 2016, Justin Pierce and Peter Schott
published an article in a leading economics journal focused on the
“Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment” after
2000.425 Yet U.S. manufacturing employment at multinational firms
has been declining for a long time, as is clear from Figure 2. If that figure could be produced in 2010,426 a similar figure could have been
produced in 1998. And if it were produced then, alarm bells would
have probably started ringing twenty years ago.
One could have looked at import exposure of U.S. manufacturing
industries as well, as Germán Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon recently did.427 Again, the trend depicted in Figure 3 was clear by 2000,
even if not as dramatic as it became afterwards.

423. The sole working paper revealing distributional effects of NAFTA, which was
later published as Looking for Local Labor-Market Effects of NAFTA, Hakobyan &
McLaren, supra note 91, was available at least as early as 2010. See John McLaren &
Shushanik Hakobyan, Looking for Local Labor Market Effects of NAFTA (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 16535, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16535
[https://perma.cc/9ADA-TKZ4]. An early draft of The China Syndrome: Local Labor
Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, Autor et al., supra note 98,
was available at least as early as 2011. See http://economics.mit.edu/files/7723
[https://perma.cc/8DVA-LDZS]. This was the first study showing the impact of the
China Shock. See Goldberg, supra note 84, at 7.
424. See Ebenstein et al., supra note 422.
425. Pierce & Schott, supra note 98, at 1632.
426. The draft version of this article was available at least as early as 2010. See
Autor et al., supra note 98, at 2167 (citing the 2010 working paper later published as
Estimating the Impact of Trade and Offshoring on American Workers Using the Current
Population Surveys, Ebenstein et al., supra note 422).
427. See Gutiérrez & Philippon, supra note 320.
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Figure 3. Import exposure for manufacturing industries.428
Turning to the growing evidence of product market concentration, Figure 4 shows the rise in markups during the past several decades. If economists looked at this data in 1990, they probably would
have taken notice. By 2000 they would have seen a clear red flag. The
paper reporting this data was published in 2020.

428. Gutiérrez & Philippon, supra note 320, at 31 fig.9.
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Figure 4. The evolution of average markups from 1955 to 2016.429
Now consider the rise of monopsony power in labor markets
caused by the small number of employers in the American heartland.
As is clear from Figure 5, here too the alarming trend had emerged by
the early 2000s. Here too the trend remained undetected until now.

429. De Loecker et al., supra note 123, at 575 fig.I.
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Figure 5. Trends in average local-level employment concentration,
1977–2009.430
Observing the timing of all these trends, one has to agree with one
of the leading trade economists, Gordon Hanson. Explaining to a New
York Times correspondent who was trying to understand why voters
supporting candidate Donald Trump’s protectionist policies seemed
to have discovered the devastating effects of trade liberalization before the economists did, Hanson confessed that “it took a while for academics to catch up.”431 Now that economists have done so, policymakers will have much more timely data about distributional impacts,
enabling them to respond with policy adjustments if they choose to do
so.432
C. FISCAL FEDERALISM
This Article urges greater national uniformity to alleviate the geographically uneven burdens of free trade, labor market concentration, environmental regulation, and so on. Greater national uniformity
stands in obvious tension with local experimentation. As various
430. Benmelech et al., supra note 147, at 28 fig.I.
431. Schwartz & Bui, supra note 35. Hanson was commenting on the effects of the
China Shock on the U.S. economy.
432. Indeed, a flurry of research findings discussed in the Conclusion strongly supports this conjecture.
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scholars have pointed out, this experimentation may lead to more efficient local government that emerges from inter-governmental competition to attract more (and more affluent) residents, greater ability
of residents to choose among various packages of local amenities,
fewer governmental intrusions into the operation of markets, greater
accountability of local officials, and a possible check on abuse of power
at the federal level.433
All these arguments have counterarguments, and this Article
does not attempt to resolve the long-standing debates about federalism in general and fiscal federalism in particular. The Article’s contribution to this debate, however, is to highlight a growing body of empirical research that points strongly in the same direction. A highly
variable social safety net as well as high and growing state-created
barriers to entry exacerbate and prolong the economic suffering resulting from major federal policies discussed in this Article. This evidence should weigh heavily in policymakers’ balancing of costs and
benefits of greater national uniformity.
CONCLUSION
Along with the rest of the world, the United States is facing two
profound challenges. First, the country needs to find a long-lasting
medical solution to a global pandemic. Second, and as important, the
country needs to find a durable economic solution to the pandemic’s
consequences.
Sadly, but not surprisingly, the emerging evidence reveals that
these consequences have much in common with those described in
this Article. Again, it is low-skill, low-wage workers who are bearing
the brunt of the economic contraction caused by the spread of COVID19.434 Again, the burdens are concentrated geographically, making
433. For a discussion of these arguments and references to varied literature, see,
for example, Galle & Leahy, supra note 34; Wallace E. Oates, Toward a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 12 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 349, 350–51 (2005); and Super, supra note 25, at 2556–60.
434. See Simon Mongey, Laura Pilossoph & Alex Weinberg, Which Workers Bear the
Burden of Social Distancing Policies? 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
27085, 2020), http://www.nber.org/papers/w27085 [https://perma.cc/NE56
-XPRV] (“[W]orkers in occupations that are more likely to be affected by social distancing policies are workers [who are] more economically vulnerable.”); see also Alexander
W. Bartik, Marianne Bertrand, Feng Lin, Jesse Rothstein & Matthew Unrath, Measuring
the Labor Market at the Onset of the COVID-19 Crisis, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 15–16 (June 25, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/
06/Bartik-et-al-conference-draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK2U-9BUY] (finding that
economic contraction caused by COVID-19 disproportionately affected low-wage, loweducation workers); Tomaz Cajner, Leland D. Crane, Ryan A. Decker, John Grigsby,
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low mobility of low-skill workers particularly costly.435 Given these
similarities, the policies advocated in this Article—broad-based transitional assistance, a stronger and nationally uniform social safety net,
and some distributionally informed legal rules—are precisely the
ones needed to help vulnerable Americans (and the country as a
whole) recover from the economic devastation of the pandemic.436
Yet, it is by no means clear that the government will pursue these
programs after the emergency cash infusions into the economy inevitably come to an end. Nor is it the case that academics have developed
widely shared views about how to design, implement, evaluate, and
improve distributional policies.
The two distributional arguments may well be part of the reason
for this unfortunate state of affairs. Global pandemics happen rarely,
as do major financial crises like the Great Depression or the Great Recession. In contrast, legal rules change more often, including the major
changes described in this Article. These relatively frequent changes,
and the new economic burdens they bring, offer scholars plenty of
chances to focus on designing and refining the types of programs that
this Article advocates. No doubt, some of that work was being done all
along.437 But it is easy to imagine that more would have been done if
Adrian Hamins-Puertolas, Erik Hurst, Christopher Kurz & Ahu Yildirmaz, The U.S. Labor Market During the Beginning of the Pandemic Recession 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 27159, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/
working_papers/w27159/w27159.pdf [https://perma.cc/C95G-PVUQ] (finding that
the “employment losses during the Pandemic Recession are disproportionately concentrated among lower wage workers”); Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Nathaniel Hendren & Michael Stepner, How Did COVID-19 and Stabilization Policies Affect Spending
and Employment? A New Real-Time Economic Tracker Based on Private Sector Data 4
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27431, 2020), https://www.nber.org/
system/files/working_papers/w27431/w27431.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW9Y-HV6Y]
(finding that low-wage hourly workers were especially likely to lose jobs and that job
postings fell more sharply for low-skill positions).
435. See Jose Maria Barrero, Nicholas Bloom & Steven J. Davis COVID-19 Is Also a
Reallocation Shock, 3, 24–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27137,
2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27137/w27137.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XL5G-HGHB] (suggesting that occupational licensing restrictions
that significantly “impede mobility across occupations and states” are likely to be
among major reasons likely to “retard . . . responses to the pandemic-induced reallocation shock”); Chetty et al., supra note 434, at 3, 5 (finding that while fewer than 30% of
workers employed by small businesses were laid off in the lowest-rent zip codes, that
number exceeded 65% in the highest-rent zip codes, and emphasizing that “geographic
disparities in unemployment persist for many years due to limited migration”).
436. Others agree. See, e.g., Chetty et al., supra note 434, at 5 (emphasizing the need
for stronger social insurance and targeted assistance for low-income individuals in areas that have suffered the largest losses).
437. See supra note 397.
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scholars working on these issues did not feel compelled to articulate
reasons why any distributional adjustments should be made in the
first place before considering what these adjustments should be.438 If
the two distributional arguments were not viewed as the default
guides for practical policymaking, perhaps academics would have
been more prepared today to offer concrete policy solutions as a
global pandemic made the need for these solutions both obvious and
urgent.
This Article shows that the core assumptions of the efficiencyonly and no-compensation arguments are implausible. Evidence for
this conclusion comes not from a few isolated reforms or several modest distributional shifts. Rather, major changes in the U.S. economy facilitated by many government policies likely produced distributional
burdens that the arguments either dismiss or assume away. As general guides for real-world governance, the two distributional argument do not survive a reality check.
If so, perhaps the conversation should move on. We should keep
in mind the powerful logic of the two distributional arguments, and
we should take seriously the arguments’ well-known implications
where appropriate. But as a general matter, we should remember that
the core assumptions of the two arguments do not hold and their
standard policy prescriptions do not follow. So those who have relied
on the two arguments to support a view favoring limited government
involvement in distributional outcomes should now look elsewhere
for analytical support. And those who viewed the two arguments as
conceptual obstacles to a more distributionally sensitive and egalitarian social and economic agenda should realize that when the two arguments are retrofitted with realistic assumptions, they support this
agenda rather than oppose it.

438. As recently as 2018, Richard Revesz felt that he had to devote a substantial
part of his article to explaining why the efficiency-only argument does not hold for environmental, health, and safety regulation. See Revesz, supra note 18, at 1511–25.

